The 9/11 Commission Report One Year Later: A Citizens Response – Did The Commission Get It Right?

July 22, 2005 Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Building, Room 345 Independence Ave. & First St., SE

Agenda

Part One: A Critical Examination of the 9/11 Commission

We	elcome
9:00 – 9:05 am:	Moderator: Verna Avery Brown, Pacifica Radio
	Opening Statements
9:05 - 9:15	Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA)
	9/11 Families Report
	Unanswered Questions and The Call for Accountability
9:15 - 9:50	Lorie Van Auken, 9/11 Family Steering Committee
	Mindy Kleinberg, 9/11 Family Steering Committee
9:50 – 9:55	Pastor West's Blessing
	Behind the 9/11 Commission: Flaws in the Process
	Staff Report – A Citizens Critique
10:00 - 10:10	John Judge, staff and 9/11 Citizens Watch
	Conflicts of Interest - A Commission Investigates Itself
10:10 - 10:20	Mel Goodman, former CIA, Center for International Policy
	Whistleblowers Ignored
10:20 - 10:25	David MacMichaels, former CIA employee
10:25 - 10:30	Questions
	Omissions and Errors in the Commission's Final
	Report
	NORAD/FAA, P-56 Responses, Pre-9/11 Exercises
10:30 - 10:40	Paul Thompson, author of Terror Timeline
10:40 - 10:45	John Judge, staff and 9/11 Citizens Watch
	Suspects and Plots, the link to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden
10:45 10:55	Nafeez Ahmed author of The War on Freedom

	The \$100,000 Transfer – Pakistan ISI, bin Laden and
	US Intelligence
10:55 - 11:10	The state of the s
11:10 - 11:20	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
11:20 - 11:40	Were Other Countries Involved?
11:20 - 11:40	Paul Thompson, author of Terror Timeline Foreknowledge and Forewarnings of 9/11
11:40 - 11:50	
11:50 - 12:00	yyyyyy
	9/11 in Historical Perspective: Flawed Assumptions
10.00 10.1	The Underground World of Terrorist Financing
12:00 – 12:10) pm Lauretta Napolione, author of Modern Jihad, Terror Incorporated
	Deep Politics: Contragate, Drugs, Oil, Covert Operations and
	Terrorism
12:10 - 12:25	total Data Boots, autitor of Drago, ou at war
	Afghanistan Mujahedin – Covert Operations, Creating
12:25 - 12:40	Terrorism
12.23 - 12:40	Nafeez Ahmed, author of The War on Truth The Rise of the Neo-Conservatives
12:40 - 12:55	
12.10 12.55	American Empire
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12:55 - 1:00	Questions
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	Civil Liberties in American Post-9/11: Is Security Worth the Trade?
2:50 - 3:00	Mary Rose Oakar, President ADC
3:00-3:10	Elaine Cassel, author of The War on Civil Liberties
5,00	The Rise of Secrecy After 9/11
3:10 - 3:20	Rebecca Daugherty, Reporters Committee on Freedom of the Press
	The Patriot Acts – Sunset on Freedom?
3:20-3:35	William Michaels, author of No Greater Threat
3:35 - 3:45	Questions
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	Intelligence Reform: Immediate Response and
	Recommendations
<i>1</i> 3	The New DNI: Congressional Oversight and Unbiased
	Intelligence?
3:45 - 4:00	Mel Goodman, former CIA, Center for International Policy
4:00-4:10	Ray McGovern, veteran of Analysis Directorate of CIA
	"The Wall": Breaking Down the Division of Intelligence,
	Military and Law Enforcement
4:10-4:20	David MacMichaels, former CIA
	Covert Operations and Increased Intelligence Budget –
	Solution or Cause?
4:20-4:35	John Nutter, author of The CIA's Black Operations
4:35 – 4:45	Questions
	Conclusions and the Need for New Investigation,
	Release of Files
4:45 - 5:00	Rep. Cynthia McKinney
5:00 pm:	Close

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CYNTHIA MCKINNEY

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTE ON MUTARY PERSONNEL
SUBCOMMITTE ON TERMORISM



Congress of the United States House of Representatives

Washington, 200 20515-1004

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July 22, 2005

Statement from Rep. Cynthia McKinney (GA) DID THE 9/11 COMMISSION GET IT RIGHT?

A Briefing on the Unanswered Questions, Omissions and Recommendations

Dear Honorable Members, staff, members of the media, family members, and all guests,

My esteemed colleague Rep. Raúl Grijalva (AZ) and I are co-sponsoring today's important and historic briefing on outstanding and still unanswered questions about the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to provide an opportunity for Members of Congress, their staff and legislative assistants to hear critical and informed testimony about the 9/11 Commission's Final Report on the first anniversary of its release.

Today you will hear testimony from family members who lost loved ones on 9/11, from whistleblowers and former intelligence officers, academics and experts arranged in seven panels encompassing a wide range of issues of outstanding concern one year after the release of the 9/11 Commission Report.

The briefing will begin with victim family members presenting their current concerns about the 9/11 Commission and discussing the many unanswered questions that still remain. Following this we will hear from experts speaking on the weaknesses of the 9/11 Commission's process and conclusions, and the serious errors in or omissions absent from the Commission's Final Report.

After lunch, there will be three panels offering a critical examination of the Report's recommendations in the areas of foreign policy, domestic policy and intelligence reform. Panelists will offer alternative recommendations that deserve our consideration.

When we consider that all the forensic evidence, classified and unclassified records, all interview and documents used as the basis of the investigation of the Final Report are now classified, and are locked up until January 2nd, 2009... When we take note of a Zogby Poll of August 2004 indicating that 36% of New York City residents believe that the 9/11 Commission had 'answered all the important questions' and 66% called for another full investigation of the 'still unanswered questions' by Congress... We must ask how Congress can accept the 9/11 Commission's conclusions and recommendations as the 'final' word on the investigation into the murder of 3,000 Americans? If it does, will it require a citizens' investigation to get to the bottom of 9/11?

The families and the American public have a right to know ALL the truth about what happened on September 11th.

With warmest regards I remain, Rep. Cynthia McKinney

July 22 2005 Congressional Brioting

SPEAKER BIOS

The 9/11 Commission Report One Year Later:
A Citizens' Response - Did They Get It Right?

Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development in London, England. He is author of the recently published book The War on Truth: 9/11, Disinformation, and the Anatomy of Terrorism, which deconstructs the findings of the 9/11 Commission Report and investigates the worldwide web of terrorist networks across space and time. This book is a sequel to his earlier bestseller The War on Freedom: How and Why America was Attacked: September 11, 2001, which won him the Naples Prize, Italy's most prestigious literary award. Ahmed holds a first-class masters degree in Contemporary War and Peace Studies from the University of Sussex, where he is currently a Doctoral Candidate at the Department of International Relations and Politics, researching genocide, imperialism, and structural violence.

Elaine Cassel is the author of The War on Civil Liberties (2004), which documents the erosion of civil rights and liberties under the Bush administration and synthesizes the numerous instances in which Americans have surrendered liberty to purchase security to argue that it is a false tradeoff. She is an attorney, and a Professor of Law at Concord and Marymount Universities. Cassel is a regular contributor for Findlaw and the blog Civil Liberties Watch, covering such issues as the (mis)use of torture to extract information, legal challenges to the Patriot Act, prosecutorial misconduct and other current issues involving the judicial system.

Kit Gage is president and founder of the National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom (www.ncppf.org) and has directed the First Amendment Foundation and the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation (www.ncarl.org) since April 2001. She is a regular contributor to various journals on matters concerning freedom of speech and other civil liberties, immigrant rights, women's rights and other human rights issues. Gage was Executive Vice President, and earlier, the first Legal Worker Vice President of the National Lawyers Guild. She also served as a board member of the Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA. A graduate of Grinnell College with an independent degree in Women, Socialization and Conflict, she is married and has two remarkable adult daughters.

Mel Goodman is a professor of International Security at the National War College and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy. From 1966-1986 he was a senior CIA soviet analyst. IN 1991 he was one of three former CIA officials to testify before the Senate against the nomination of Robert Gates as Director of Central Intelligence on the grounds that he had slanted intelligence to suit policy. Goodman is co-author of Bush League Diplomacy: How the Neoconservatives are Putting the World at Risk. He recently joined the Center for International Policy to lead their Intelligence Reform Project.

Mindy Kleinberg is widow to husband Alan, killed in the attacks upon the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001. Alan Kleinberg, 39, worked for Cantor Fitzgerald on the 104th floor of WTC Tower One. Kleinberg served as co-chair of the Family Steering Committee for the 9/11 Independent Commission. With fellow widows Lorie Van Auken, Kristen Breitweiser and Patty Cazassa, Ms. Kleinberg helped to found September 11th Advocates, setting out to discover the truth about why their husbands were killed on September 11th, and how and by whom. Together, these women put aside their grief, knocked on doors and twisted arms until Congress and the President agreed to form an independent commission to investigate how the attacks happened. The iron determination of the 'Jersey Girls,' as they are now widely known, earned them national and international notoriety. Unsatisfied with many aspects of the 9/11 Commission and its Report, they continue to press for accountability, and refuse to accept that what happened was simply a failure of processes and organizations, and not people. Kleinberg also served as co-chair of the Family Steering Committee for the 9/11 Independent Commission.

Bob McIlvaine is father of Bobby McIlvaine, 26, Assistant VP of media relations at Merrill Lynch, who died on September 11th, 2001 in the attacks on the World Trade Center. Bobby did not work at the twin towers, so Bob and his wife Helen were not immediately worried and only found out his death later. A retired counselor to troubled teenagers and one-time tavern owner from Philadelphia, McIlvaine was at the hospital in suburban Philadelphia where he worked with teenagers when he heard the news of the attack. Bob never saw his son's body. Bobby was only positively identified by dental records. The effect of his son's death was traumatizing for Bob. However, after being laid off from his job in early 2003, McIlvaine did what many other families of 9/11 victims had done and got involved by joining September 11th Families for Peaceful Tomorrows, an advocacy group that opposes violence as a response to 9/11 and seeks dialogue between families of 9/11 victims and families of victims of the Afghan and Iraq wars.

David MacMichael, Ph.D. is a historian and former US Marine officer who served in the CIA as a senior estimates officer at the National Intelligence Center (NIC) specializing in Western Hemisphere Affairs. After leaving the CIA in 1983, MacMichael publicly charged that the Reagan administration was falsifying the so-called intelligence about arms shipments from Nicaragua to insurgent forces in El Salvador. He testified to this at the World Court in the trial of Nicaragua v. US. During the 1980s and early 1990s he was editor and publisher of the magazine UNCLASSIFIED opposing the use of covert intelligence operations.

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Currently he is a member of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity.

C. William Michaels is author of No Greater Threat (2002), an in-depth analysis of the Patriot Act that seeks to start an alternative, parallel dialog about the 'war on terrorism' and how to prevent it from becoming a war on ourselves and the Constitution. He is a Baltimore attorney with a solo appellate practice that involves writing appellate briefs for other attorneys. Michaels has an extensive background as an author and journalist, including serving as developer and producer of the award-winning weekly cable television program WorldViews, which aired in East Coast cities from 1994 to 1996, and as Legal Editor at the Bureau of National Affairs. Michaels is co-founder and coordinator of the Baltimore chapter of Pax Christi, and is a member of the Catholic Labor Committee. He graduated from Brandeis University magna cum laude and is also a graduate of the University of Maryland School of Law, where he held an editorial positions for the Law Review and Law Forum.

Jumana Musa is a human rights attorney and activist. She is currently the Advocacy Director for Domestic Human Rights and International Justice at Amnesty International, where she addresses the domestic and international impact of the Bush administration's "war on terror" on human rights. She has also served as Amnesty International's legal observer for the military commission proceedings at the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Loretta Napoleoni is author of Terror Incorporated, tracing the dollars behind the terror networks (2005) whose original title was Modern Jihad, the first book to tackle issues raised by the attacks of September 11th, 2001 from an economic perspective. In Terror Incorporated, she reveals how the 'new economy of terror' has evolved by proxy through various wars—from the Cold War to the 'war on terror'—and shifting the focus away from religious and cultural differences, argues that Islamic terror groups are driven by real economic forces in the Muslim world. Napoleoni has worked as a consultant for Homeland Security and was chairman of the countering terrorist financing group at the Madrid conference on Terrorism, Democracy and Security. She is an economist who has worked for banks and international organizations in Europe and the U.S. She is also a journalist and has worked as a foreign correspondent for several Italian financial papers. She has written novels and guidebooks in Italian, and has translated and edited books on terrorism. Her most recent novel, Dossier Baghdad, is a financial thriller set during the Gulf War. She was among the few people to interview the Red Brigades in Italy after three decades of silence.

John Newman spent 21 years in Army Intelligence and served as Assistant to the Director of the National Security Agency. He also served as an attaché in China. He is a history professor at UMD, and has been teaching courses on counterterrorism for 10 years. Newman has written and published widely and is working on a manuscript about the events leading up to 9/11.

Anne Norton, Ph.D. is author of Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (Yale University Press 2004), in which she traces the influence of German-Jewish emigré scholar Leo Strauss on the neoconservative movement and the bush administration. Norton, the Alfred Cass Term Chair Professor of Political Science and Comparative Literature at the University of Pennsylvania, has written numerous books, chapters and articles on American popular culture and political theory. These include Republic of Signs: Liberal Theory and American Popular Culture, and Alternative Americas.

John Nutter, Ph.D. is a political scientist and the author of *The CIA's Black Ops: Covert Action, Foreign Policy, and Democracy* (2000), which charts the CIA's secret operations and controversial plans, revealing a country fascinated by covert action. He has served as a faculty member at Michigan State University and Texas A&M University, where he taught courses on covert action, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and international politics. As a consultant, he has instructed federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel on domestic terrorism, and has served as a security/anti-terrorism advisor to numerous organizations. Nutter has made hundreds of media appearances, including CNN, the BBC, TV-Tokyo, and NPR.

Mary Rose Oakar is currently President of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC). A life-long resident of Cleveland, Ohio, she received her B.A. at Ursuline College and her M.A. at John Carroll University, both in Cleveland. A former professor, she has received several Honorary Doctorates. Oakar has served on the Cleveland City Council, the Ohio House of Representatives and, for sixteen years, in the United States House of Representatives. In Congress she advocated for peace and justice in the Middle East and for those of Middle East ancestry in the United States. In addition, she served as a monitor for the Palestinian elections and has attended Middle East Peace signings at the White House, in Egypt and Jordan, and once accompanied President Clinton to Syria. McCall's Magazine named Oakar "one of the ten best members of Congress for health and women's issues," and she has received numerous awards for her legislation concerning breast cancer and the elderly.

Wiliam Pepper, Ed.D. is an author and English barrister and an American lawyer with specialized training in international law and international human rights. He convened a seminar on International Human Rights at Oxford University. He maintains a practice in the U.S. and the U.K.

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Marilynn M. Rosenthal is the mother of Josh Rosenthal who was killed in the attack on the South Tower of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. She is currently editing her book 9/11: Searching for My Son and His Killers. Since her son's death she has become an expert on warnings about and preceding the 9/11 attack. She is professor emerita, medical sociologist and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Internal Medicine at the University of Michigan Medical School. She is also an Associate Director of the UM Medical School's Program in Society and Medicine. She is the author of nine books, many dealing with issues of medical malpractice, including: Medical Error (2002) and Medical Mishaps (1997). Rosenthal is an elected Fellow of the British and Swedish Royal Societies of Medicine, and has received numerous grants and honors, including a Danforth Fellowship, UM Hopwood writing award, a Distinguished Faculty Research Award and a Fulbright Western European Research Award.

Peter Dale Scott Ph.D. is professor emeritus of English at the University of California, Berkeley. He is author of Drugs, Oil and War (2003), and seven other books including Deep Politics and the Death of JFK (1993, 1996) and The Iran-Contra Connection (in collaboration, 1987). He has also published award-winning poetry. Both his prose and poetry deal among other matters with U.S. covert operations, their impact on democracy at home and abroad, their relations to the John F. Kennedy assassination and their relations to the global drug traffic. Scott holds degrees from McGill University in Montreal, the city of his birth. Prior to having taught for thirty-four years at UC Berkeley, Scott was a Canadian diplomat and served at the United Nations and the Canadian Embassy in Warsaw, Poland.

Wayne Smith is Senior Fellow and Director, at the Center for International Policy, where he directs the Cuba Program and is a contributor to the National Security Program. He is a visiting professor of Latin American studies and Director of the University of Havana exchange Program at Johns Hopkins University. He is a former Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. During his twenty-five years with the State Department (1957-82), he served as executive secretary of President Kennedy's Latin American Task Force and chief of mission at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. In addition, he served in Argentina, Brazil and the Soviet Union.

Paul Thompson is a freelance researcher and is the creator of the Center for Cooperative Research's Complete 9/11 Timeline (www.cooperativeresearch.org), a compilation of over 5,000 articles and reports on 9/11. In the aftermath of the of September 11th attacks, Thompson found himself poring over news of the attacks on the internet, and growing increasingly frustrated with how incomplete the story of September 11th was. He began gathering and condensing every credible fact on 9/11, and posted these facts online in chronological order to build a 'terror timeline.' His site quickly grew to thousands of news items and what started as a hobby soon became Thompson's obsession. Thompson quit his San Francisco-based job with a California-based environmental protection group working to preserve the rainforest in Borneo and moved to New Zealand to go full-time with Cooperative Research. The timeline was made available online in a form that allowed visitors to make corrections to his data and add new information. Open-source historiography had arrived. The timeline is published in book form and has become a trusted source for reporters and researchers. Thompson now divides his time between California and New Zealand.

Lorie Van Auken is widow to husband Kenneth, killed in the attacks upon the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001. Kenneth Van Auken, 47, worked for Cantor Fitzgerald on the 105th floor of Tower One. Van Auken served as co-chair of the Family Steering Committee for the 9/11 Independent Commission, and with fellow widows Mindy Kleinberg, Kristen Breitweiser and Patty Cazassa, Ms. Van Auken helped to found September 11th Advocates. Together, these women put aside their grief, knocked on doors and twisted arms until Congress and the President agreed to form an independent commission to investigate how the attacks happened. They refused to give up until even the most reluctant players bared their Presidential Daily Briefs. The iron determination of the 'Jersey Girls,' as they are now widely known, earned them national and international notoriety. Unsatisfied with many aspects of the 9/11 Commission and its Report, they continue to press for accountability, and refuse to accept that what happened was simply a failure of processes and organizations, and not people.

Explicit warnings from foreign sources

1. 1999. The U.S. was warned by British intelligence two years prior to "911" that terrorists were planning to use airplanes in unconventional ways, perhaps as bombs

In 1999, Britain's intelligence agency, M16, warned the U.S. in a classified report that al Qaeda was planning to use airplanes in an unconventional manner to attack U.S. interests. No targets were specified. The *Times* of London quoted a British senior Foreign Office source saying, "The Americans knew of plans to use commercial aircraft in unconventional ways, possibly as flying bombs." (cited in AFP 6-9-2002)

2. April to May 2001. U.S. government received 'specific' threats of terrorist attacks against U.S. targets or interests

Condoleezza Rice admitted that the U.S. government had received "specific" threats that "al Qaeda attacks against U.S. targets or interests . . . might be in the works. There was a clear concern that something was up, but it was principally focused overseas. The areas of most concern were the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula and Europe." (cited in CNN 5-16-2002 "Timeline: Events leading up to September 11") She did not elaborate on where the intelligence originated, but the *Independent* of London, reported that the information had been relayed to Washington by British intelligence sources. (Bennetto and Gumbel 5-18-2002)

3. June 6, 2001. German intelligence warned CIA

The German intelligence agency, the BND, warned both the CIA and Israel that Middle Eastern terrorists were "planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack important symbols of American and Israeli culture." This intelligence reportedly came from Echelon, a high-tech electronic surveillance system used by the intelligence agencies of several nations to glean through electronic communications for certain keywords. It was first reported by the German daily newspaper, *Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung* on September 13. Its sources were reportedly from the BND itself. (Stafford 9-13-2001; Thomas 5-21-2002) According to Gordon Thomas (5-21-2002) of *Global - Intel*, the original source of information actually came from Israeli Mossad agents operating in the U.S. who had infiltrated al Qaeda. According to his account the Mossad also informed British and Russian intelligence about the attacks, who then in turn notified the CIA. Thomas's sources are allegedly informants within the Mossad itself.

4. <u>July 16, 2001. British intelligence sent a report to Tony Blair warning of imminent attacks. The report was also sent to Washington</u>

The British Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) sent a memo authored by the heads of British intelligence agencies, MI6, MI5 and GCHQ, to Tony Blair and other cabinet ministers, warning that al Qaeda was in the final stages of preparing for a terrorist attack. The memo suggested that the attacks would likely be aimed at American or Israeli targets. The report did not indicate however that the agencies had any knowledge with regards to the "timings, targets and methods of attack." According to the Times of London, the warning was "based on intelligence gleaned not just from MI6 and GCHQ but also from US agencies, including the CIA and the National Security Agency, which has staff working jointly with GCHQ." [Emphasis added] The newspaper added, "The CIA sometimes has a representative on the JIC. The contents of the July 16 warning would have been passed to the Americans, Whitehall confirmed." (Evans 6-14-2002)

5. <u>June 23, 2001. Arabic News Network reported that bin Laden had predicted a 'severe blow' to the United States.</u>

"According to the June 23rd AirlineBiz.com report, the Arabic satellite television network MBC claimed that 'the next two weeks will witness a big surprise.' An MBC reporter who had met with bin Laden in Afghanistan on June 21st predicted that 'a severe blow is expected against U.S. and Israeli interests worldwide. There is a major state of mobilization among the Osama bin Laden forces. It seems that there is a race of who will strike first. Will it be the United States or Osama bin Laden?" (Grigg 3-11-2002)

6. Summer 2001. Jordan's General Intelligence Division (GID) warned Washington of an attack planned on the U.S. mainland using aircraft.

According to John Cooley (5-21-2002), author of the book, *Unholy Wars: America, Afghanistan, and International Terrorism*, Jordan's intelligence agency, GID, intercepted al Qaeda communications indicating that a terrorist operation, code-named 'Al Ourush al Kabir' or 'The Big Wedding,' was being planned for within the U.S. and would involve aircraft. Cooley confirmed the validity of this warning. (see also Bubnov 5-24-2002)

7. Summer 2001. Iranian man warned U.S. authorities of a planned terrorist attack during the week of September 9, 2001

Online.ie reported "German police have confirmed an Iranian man phoned US police from his deportation cell to warn of the planned attack on the World Trade Centre" during the week of September 9. He reportedly called several times. Very little information was given about the 'Iranian man' other than the fact that he was 28-years old. No other news agencies independently reported the incident. (Online.ie 9/14/01; cited in Anova 9-14-2001; Ruppert 11-2-2001; 11-24-2001; 4-22-2002)

8. August 2001. Moroccan intelligence warned Washington about "large scaleoperations in New York in the summer or autumn of 2001"

According to reports published in November 2001 by a French magazine and a Moroccan newspaper, Morocco's royal intelligence informed Washington that one of its agents, who had penetrated al Qaeda, learned that bin Laden's organization was preparing "large operations in New York in the summer or autumn of 2001." The agent, who is said to be presently in the U.S. helping its intelligence agencies, also informed Moroccan intelligence that bin Laden was 'very disappointed' with the first WTC bombing which failed to bring the two towers down. John Cooley (5-21-2002), who reported this in the *International Herald Tribune* wrote that as of 5-21-2002, he had not independently verified this warning. (see also Bubnov 5-24-2002)

9. August 2001. Israel warned U.S. about large-scale attacks on the U.S. mainland

Israeli intelligence officials say that they warned their counterparts in the United States last month that large-scale terrorist attacks on highly visible targets on the American mainland were imminent." (Jacobson and Wastell 9-16-2001; Davis 9-17-2001; Stafford 9-13-2001; Serrano and Thor-Dahlburg 9-20-2001; Martin 1-5-2002; Martin 1-16-2002) According to Gordan Thomas (5-21-2002), this information was based on intelligence gleaned from Israeli Mossad agents who had penetrated or were spying on the al Qaeda operatives. Thomas's sources are allegedly informants within the Mossad itself.

10. August 2001. Intelligence sources warned Argentine Jewish leaders of imminent attacks

According to Argentine Jewish leaders, the Jewish community in that country "received a warning about an impending major terrorist attack against the United States, Argentina or France just weeks before September 11. Forward quoted Marta Nercellas, a lawyer for the Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas, or DAIA, Argentina's main Jewish representative body: "It was a concrete warning that an attack of major proportion would take place, and it came from a reliable intelligence [source]. And I understand the Americans were told about it." [Emphasis added] (Forward 2-5-2002)

11. August 24, 2001. Russian intelligence warned of possible hijacking

Russian intelligence warned the CIA that 25 terrorist pilots were specifically training to crash airliners into planned targets. This was reported by the Russian *Izveztia* on September 12 and translated for *From The Wilderness Magazine* by a former CIA officer. (cited from Ruppert 11-2-2001; see also Ruppert 11-24-2001; 4-22-2002; Martin 1-5-2002; Martin 1-16-2002) According to Gordan Thomas (5-21-2002) Russian intelligence received this information from the Israeli Mossad.

12. August 31, 2001. Egyptian president warned U.S. that something was brewing

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak warned the U.S. that "something would happen" 12 days before the terrorist attacks. (AP 12-7-2001; MacFarquhar and Tyler 6-4-2002; Martin 1-5-2002). Egypt had also warned the U.S. on June 13. (Martin 1-16-2002). The U.S. intelligence denied that they had received this information soon before the attacks and instead alleged that the only warnings that had been given to them from Egypt occurred between March and May of 2001. (MacFarquhar and Tyler 6-4-2002)

13. September 1, 2001. Russian intelligence warned the U.S. again about 'imminent attacks'

"Russian President Vladimir Putin orders Russian intelligence to warn the U.S. government 'in the strongest possible terms' of imminent attacks on airports and government buildings" (We do not have a reference to the original source. See Ruppert 11-2-2001; 4-22-2002 based on MS-NBC interview with Putin, September 15. See also Martin 1-16-2002; Thomas 5-21-2002) According to Gordan Thomas (5-21-2002) Russian intelligence received this information from the Israeli Mossad.

14. Early September 2001. Mossad chief warned CIA of possibility of attacks

According to Gordon Thomas (5-21-2002), Mossad Chief Efraim Halevy warned both the CIA and FBI of the possibility of near term attacks. George Tenet presumably thought that it was "too non specific."

15. <u>September 5-6, 2001</u>

Commenting on the U.S. intelligence failure, the French Le Monde reported: "The first lapse has to do with the processing of intelligence items that come out of Europe. According to our information, French and American officials did in fact hold important meetings in Paris from the

5th to the 6th of September, that is, a few days prior to the attacks. Those sessions brought representatives of the American Special Services together with officers of the DST (Directorate of Territorial Security) and military personnel from the DGSE (General Overseas Security Administration). Their discussion turned to some of the serious threats made against American interests in Europe, specifically one targeting the U.S. Embassy in Paris. During these talks, the DST directed the American visitors' attention to a Moroccan-born Frenchman who had been detained in the United States since August 17 and who was considered to be a key high-level Islamic fundamentalist. But the American delegation, preoccupied above all with questions of administrative procedure, paid no attention to this 'first alarm,' basically concluding that they were going to take no one's advice, and that an attack on American soil was inconceivable. It took September 11 for the FBI to show any real interest in this man, who we now know attended two aviation training schools, as did at least seven of the kamikaze terrorists." (cited in Ridgeway 5-28-2002)

16. September 7, 2001. Mossad chief warned CIA a second time of possible attacks

According to Gordon Thomas (5-21-2002), Mossad Chief Efraim Halevy sent another alert to the CIA warning of possible terrorist attacks. The message was received in Washington on September 7.

17. September 3-10, 2001. Anonymous caller informed a radio talk show that Osama bin Laden's organization would be launching imminent attacks against the U.S.

"MSNBC reports on September 16 that a caller to a Cayman Islands radio talk show gave several warnings of an imminent attack on the U.S. by bin Laden in the week prior to 9/11." (We do not have a reference to the original source. See Ruppert 11-2-2001)

18. <u>September 10, 2001</u>

U.S. intelligence intercepted conversations from al Qaeda that were extremely specific. USA Today, reported "Two U.S. intelligence officials, paraphrasing highly classified intercepts, say they include such remarks as, 'Good things are coming,' 'Watch the news' and 'Tomorrow will be a great day for us.'" [Emphasis added] This information was contained with 13,000 pages of material from the National Security Agency that was handed over to the Congressional 9-11 inquiry. It is unclear when these intercepts were reviewed by U.S. intelligence. They may not have been reviewed until after 9-11. (Diamond 6-3-2002)

19. September 11, 2001. Employees at Odigo Inc, received warnings predicting the attacks hours before they happened

The Israeli company, Odigo, Inc. was apparently warned two hours before the attacks. Odigo CEO Micha Macover told the *Ha'aretz* that 'two workers received the messages predicting the attack would happen.' The FBI was quickly notified but it is presently not clear if U.S. authorities are still investigating the incident. The company's offices in Israel are located suspiciously near the Israeli Institute for Counter Terrorism which broke story of the insider trading scam on 9-11. (McWilliams 9-28-2001; Seberg 9-28-2001; Ruppert 2-11-2002; 4-22-2002)

1. 1994. FBI videotaped an informant being recruited as a suicide bomber by two men, one of whom was linked to Osama bin Laden

Summarizing a letter written by former FBI Special Agent James Hauswirth, the Los Angeles Times wrote, "The 27-year FBI veteran said in the letter reviewed by the Los Angeles Times that the Phoenix office had evidence of Islamic potential terrorists operating in the region as far back as 1994. That year, two men were videotaped by FBI agents recruiting a Phoenix FBI informant as a suicide bomber, the letter says. One of those men, according to a source, was linked to a terrorist in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing." (Los Angeles Times 5-27-2002)

2. 1996-2001. The FBI was investigating suspected terrorists enrolled in flight schools

In 1996, after the Philippine police had discovered the 'Bojinka' plot (see above), US officials began investigating al Qaeda terrorist suspects who were training in U.S. flight schools. "Since 1996, the FBI had been developing evidence that international terrorists were using US flight schools to learn to fly jumbo jets. A foiled plot in Manila to blow up U.S. airliners and later court testimony by an associate of bin Laden had touched off FBI inquiries at several schools, officials say." (cited in Fairnaru and Grimaldi 9-23-2001; Martin 1-16-2002; Shelon 5-18-2002)

3. 1996 or 1997. FBI Counter terrorist specialist John O'Neil warned of terrorist capabilities

Soon after the late John O'Neil had become head of the FBI's New York unit, he warned, "A lot of these groups now have the capability and the support infrastructure in the United States to attack us here if they choose to." (Loeb 9-12-2002) John O'Neil, who was described as one of the FBI's 'most pugnacious' agents, resigned from the FBI shortly before 9-11. He subsequently took a position as head of the WTC security, where he is believed to have died on the day of the attacks while attempting to rescue other people in the towers. September 11 had been his first day on the job. (Loeb 9-12-2002) John O'Neil had complained that the Bush administration had impeded his investigations into suspected Saudi terrorists. (Brisard and Dasquie 2001 in Godoy 11-16-2001; Marlowe 11-19-2001)

4. 1997. FBI was investigating Middle Eastern flight school students in Phoenix

Summarizing a letter written by former FBI Special Agent James Hauswirth, the Los Angeles Times wrote: "In 1998, the office's international terrorism squad investigated a possible Middle Eastern extremist taking flight lessons at a Phoenix airport, wrote Hauswirth, who retired from the FBI in 1999." (Los Angeles Times 5-27-2002)

5. 1998. The FAA issued a warning that al Qaeda may attempt to hijack commercial airlines

Federal Aviation Administration warned airlines to be on a 'high degree of alertness' against possible hijackings by members of Osama bin Laden's organizations. (AP 5-26-2002). May 18, 1998. FBI memo observed that an 'unusually' large number of Middle Eastern men were attending flight schools. The memo revealed that an Oklahoma FBI pilot had warned his supervisor "that he has observed large numbers of Middle Eastern males receiving flight training at Oklahoma airports in recent months." The FBI pilot further observed, "This is a recent phenomena and may be related to planned terrorist activity." (Washington 5-30-2002)

6. 199? - 2001. According to anonymous sources it was widely known that important warnings were being ignored

The New American magazine interviewed three federal law enforcement agents who confirmed that the FBI had foreknowledge of the attacks. They spoke only on conditions of anonymity, although two of them told the magazine that they would be willing to testify to Congress. One agent stated that it was widely known "all over the Bureau, how these [warnings] were ignored by Washington . . . All indications are that this information came from some of [the Bureau's] most experienced guys, people who have devoted their lives to this kind of work. But their warnings were placed in a pile in someone's office in Washington . . . In some cases, these field agents predicted, almost precisely, what happened on September 11th. So we were all holding our breath . . . hoping that the situation would be remedied." [Emphasis added] (cited in Grigg 3-11-2002)

7. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 2001 report

The New York Times reported, "The Federal Aviation Administration published a report called Criminal Acts Against Aviation on its Web site in 2001 before the hijackings that said that although Osama bin Laden is not known to have attacked civil aviation, he has both the motivation and the wherewithal to do so.' It added, 'Bin Laden's anti-Western and anti-American attitudes make him and his followers a significant threat to civil aviation, particularly to U.S. civil aviation'." (Martin 1-16-2002; Sanger and Bumiller 5-17-2002)

8. Early 2001. Court proceedings revealed that al Qaeda operatives were training in American flight schools

In early 2001, the trial of four men accused of being involved in the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania revealed that members of bin Laden's network had received flying lessons in Texas and Oklahoma. (USA vs. Usama bin Laden et al.; Foden 9-13-2001; Martin 1-16-2002)

9. January-February 2001. Case of Hani Hanjour

During his attendance at an Arizona flight school, Hani Hanjour arose the suspicion of flight instructor Peggy Chevrette, who felt that Hani both lacked the skill and English for the pilot license he already had. She repeatedly called FAA authorities, who sent one of their inspectors, John Anthony, to look into her concerns. In spite of the fact that FAA guidelines clearly stipulate that fluency in English is required for a U.S. commercial pilot's license, the FAA inspector, according to Chevrette, suggested Hanjour be provided with a translator. Even after Anthony had visited the school, the flight instructor continued calling the FAA twice more with concerns that he didn't have the skills needed to have a license. Hani Hanjour left the school before completing the program. (MSNBC 5-10-2002) The flight school, JetTech, closed after September 11. Sources did not explain why. In addition to the suspicion that he arose at the flight school, he also caught the attention of an FBI informant. Aukai Collins told ABC news that he was an FBI informant for four years. He claims that in 1996, he provided the FBI with very specific information about Hani, including "his exact address, his phone number and even what car he drove." While the FBI admitted that Collins had been an informant, they 'emphatically denied' that he had tipped the agency off to Hani Hanjour. (ABC News 5-23-2002)

10. <u>February 2001. Warning from George Tenet: bin Laden and al Qaeda are the most serious threat to the U.S. and they intend to inflict mass casualties</u>

In February of 2001, CIA Director George Tenet warned that bin Laden should be considered the "most immediate and serious threat" to the U.S. and added, "As we have increased security around government and military facilities, terrorists are seeking out 'softer' targets that provide opportunities for mass casualties." (cited in CNN 5-16-2002 "Timeline: Events leading up to September 11"; Cornwell 5-25-2002)

11. Summer 2001. Former chief investigative counsel warned U.S. Justice Department that FBI believed terrorists were planning to attack lower Manhattan

- a. David Shippers, a Chicago attorney who had been the chief investigative counsel in the attempted impeachment of Clinton, warned the U.S. Justice Department that a massive terrorist attack had been planned for lower Manhattan based on what FBI agents from Chicago and Minnesota had told him. His warning was shunned by officials, one of which stated, "We don't start our investigations at the top." (cited in Grigg 3-11-2002)
- b. During an October 10, 2001 radio interview, he revealed that he had warned "Attorney General John Ashcroft and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert that he had proof from a credible source (that he has still not revealed) about a plot to use hijacked commercial airliners to ram the White House and Capitol." (Chin 5-19-2002)
- c. On May 30 2002, one of Shipper's sources in the FBI, Special Agent Robert Wright disclosed in a testimony broadcasted on C-SPAN that FBI officials and other agents had 'stymied' his own investigations into suspected terrorists. (Horrock 5-30-2002)

12. Summer 2001. The 'threat assessment'

On July 26 2001, CBS News reported that Attorney General John Ashcroft was no longer using commercial airliners to travel — even for personal business — because of a "threat assessment" issued by the FBI. Instead Ashcroft was using a chartered jet that cost taxpayers \$1,600/hr to fly. The news network further reported: "Neither the FBI nor the Justice Department, however, would identify what the threat was, when it was detected or who made it." (CBS News 7-26-2001)

13. June 2001. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) June circular

According to ABC sources the FAA distributed a circular in June of 2001 that stated, "Although we have no specific information that this threat is directed at civil aviation, the potential for terrorist operations, such as an airline hijacking to free terrorists incarcerated in the U.S. remains a concern." (ABC 5-17-2002; Hersh and Isikoff 5-27-2002) According to Newsweek's sources, 10-12 such circulars were issued to U.S. airports between June 11 and September 11 (Hersh and Isikoff 5-27-2002). One of the circulars reportedly warned of possible hijackings on flights originating from East Coast airports. (Salant 5-26-2002)

14. June 9, 2001. Internal FBI memo

Special Agent Robert Wright wrote a memo on June 9 warning the FBI that the Bureau's failure to take decisive action against known terrorist suspects operating within the country would likely

result in the loss of American lives. Parts of the memo read, "Knowing what I know, I can confidently say that until the investigative responsibilities for terrorism are transferred from the FBI, I will not feel safe. The FBI has proven for the past decade it cannot identify and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States and its citizens at home and abroad. Even worse, there is virtually no effort on the part of the FBI's International Terrorism Unit to neutralize known and suspected international terrorists living in the United States. Unfortunately, more terrorist attacks against American interests -- coupled with the loss of American lives -- will have to occur before those in power give this matter the urgent attention it deserves." (cited in Johnson 5-30-2002)

15. <u>July 2, 2001. FBI memo</u>

FBI issued a memo stating, "There are threats to be worried about overseas. While we cannot foresee attacks domestically, we cannot rule them out." (cited in CNN 5-16-2002 "Timeline: Events leading up to September 11")

16. July 3, 2001. Federal investigators learned significant intelligence from Ahmed Ressam, and al Qaeda operative who had planned to bomb Los Angeles Airport

Newsweek reported, "After he was convicted in the spring of 2001, Ressam started giving investigators detailed information on Al Qaeda's designs in the United States. He left no doubt that U.S. airports were a prime target "because an airport is sensitive politically and economically," as Ressam said in Court on July 3. (Hirsh and Isikoff 5-27-2002)

17. July 10, 2001. Internal FBI memo warned that men with suspected ties to terrorist groups were training in Arizona flight schools

- a. On July 10 of 2001, FBI agent Kenneth Williams in Arizona sent a memo from the Phoenix FBI office to the radical fundamentalist antiterrorism unit (which was aware of the Moussaoui case see below) in the Bureau's Washington headquarters warning that several Arab men with suspected ties to terrorist groups were training at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Arizona. (Solomon 5-3-2002; Risen 5-4-2002; Johnston 5-15-2002; Hersh and Isikoff 5-27-2002; Johnston and van Natta 5-21-2002; Cornwell 5-25-2002; Lumkin 5-25-2002)
- b. Interestingly, the memo mentioned Osama bin Laden by name and speculated that his organization may be attempting to infiltrate the U.S. aviation industry with pilots, security guards, and maintenance workers. (Johnston 5-15-2002). Williams had associated the flight school students with al Qaeda based on a link he had established between several of the students and the London-based militant Muslim group, al-Muhajiroun, whose leader was an open supporter of bin Laden (Seper 5-23-2002; AP 5-23-2002). One Senator who had read the memo told reporters, "I will tell you, though, that although he didn't come up with the exact Sept. 11 scenario, what he presents in that memo was so close to the fact pattern that emerged on Sept. 11 that, as you read it, it just takes your breath away." (De la Garza 5-23-2002). William's concerns were spurned in part with interviews he had conducted with the Arab students who had demonstrated extreme anti-American views (Johnston and van Natta 5-22-2002; Mitchell 5-22-2002).

c. The memorandum also made some suggestions about possible recourses of action. It stated, "Phoenix believes that the F.B.I. should accumulate a listing of civil aviation universities/colleges around the country.F.B.I. field offices with these types of schools in their area should establish appropriate liaison. F.B.I. HQ should discuss this matter with other elements of the U.S. intelligence community and task the community for any information that supports Phoenix's suspicions." No action was taken. (cited in Solomon 5-3-2002; Risen 5-4-2002)

18. July 18, 2001. FBI memo

The memo stated, "We're concerned about threats as a result of the millennium plot conviction. . . There's no specific target, no credible info of attacks to U.S. civil aviation interests, but terror groups are known to be planning and training for hijackings, and we ask you therefore to use caution." (cited in CNN 5-16-2002 "Timeline: Events leading up to September 11")

19. August 6, 2001. Memo ("The Smoking Gun RICO Act Obstruction of Justice Claim") (emphasis added).

- a. On August 6, President George Bush received an intelligence briefing, titled "BIN LADEN DETERMINED TO STRIKE IN THE U.S." that warned that bin Laden may attempt to hijack airplanes and that the Saudi millionaire's terrorist organization wanted "to bring the fight to America." This information was relayed to Bush after he had previously been supplied with intelligence of a more generalized quality that had indicated that al Qaeda was planning to attack the U.S. or U.S. interests abroad. (Eggen and Woodward 5-18-2002; CBS News 5-16-2002; Boncombe 5-19-2002).
- b. An intelligence officer told CBS News (5-16-2002) that a hijacking "was among the many things that we talked about all the time as a potential terrorist threat. But when we talked about hijackings, we talked about that in the traditional sense of hijackings, not in the sense of somebody hijacking an aircraft and flying it into a building. We talked about concern about the general noise level about al Qaeda planning and we were trying to figure out what they would do. We never had specifics about time, place, MO (method of operation)."
- c. Dan Eggen and Bob Woodward (5-18-2002; see also Buncombe 5-19-2002) of *The Washington Post* revealed that according to their sources, the August 6 briefing had been a result of Bush's request for "an intelligence analysis of possible al Qaeda attacks within the United States, because most of the information presented to him over the summer about al Qaeda focused on threats against U.S. targets overseas." Furthermore they noted that the content of the memo, as described by their sources, "was focused primarily on a discussion of possible domestic targets." This stands in stark contrast with what Condoleezza Rice had told reporters when she said that the memo had

focused primarily on threats to U.S. interests abroad. Additionally, the two reporters questioned the truthfulness of a statement given by Ari Fleischer. Whereas *The Washington Post's* sources insisted that the title of the memo was "Bin Laden determined to strike in America," Fleischer had stated that the title was "Bin Laden determined to strike America." The source of the terrorist threats contained in the August 6 memo reportedly came from British intelligence. (Bennetto and Gumbel 5-18-2002)

d. Commenting on the disturbing revelation, *The New York Times* pondered, "It was not clear this evening why the White House waited eight months after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington to reveal what Mr. Bush had been told." (Sanger 5-16-2002)

20. August 2001. The Case of Zacarias Moussaoui

- a. In August of 2001 the FBI was warned by a flight instructor in Oklahoma that an Arab student he was training could be a terrorist. The FBI responded to the lead only after receiving repeated calls from the instructor. He was arrested, but not intensely investigated until after 9-11, at which point it was discovered that he would have taken part in the 9-11 hijackings had he not been arrested.
- b. During the summer of 2001, Zacarias Moussaoui enrolled in a Pan Am flight school in Eagon, Minnesota. He paid his \$6,300 tuition in cash. (Eggen 1-2-2002; Martin 5-27-2002) After a short period of taking flight lessons at the school, it became obvious to the instructor that Zacarias had little hope of becoming a pilot. Additionally, the student's odd behavior arose suspicions. He was notably unfriendly and insisted on training to fly a Boeing 747 despite the fact that he had little experience with even small planes. (Eggen 1-2-2002; Barnett et al. 9-30-2001; Martin 1-5-2002; Martin 5-27-2002) The instructor notified the FBI, conveying his suspicions that Moussaoui might be a terrorist. It is not clear how quickly and competently the FBI responded because the accounts vary.
- c. On August 16, Moussaoui was detained for immigration violations. Here are some important aspects of the investigation that followed:
 - FBI was immediately suspicious. Investigators immediately suspected that Moussaoui was a terrorist. (Rowley 5-21-2002; Eggen 1-2-2002)
 - 2. French intelligence revealed that Moussaoui was possibly an al Qaeda operative. The FBI contacted the CIA and requested that a background check be performed on Moussaoui. On August 26, French intelligence informed the CIA that Moussaoui had radical Islamic beliefs and indicated that his friend had fought in Chechnya with a group known to have ties to Osama bin Laden. The CIA

relayed this information to the FBI. (Rowley 5-21-2002; United Press International 9-14-2001; Gordon 12-21-2001; Eggen 1-2-2002; Margasak 5-24-2002; Risen 5-25-2002; Ridgeway 5- 28-2002)

- 3. Investigators discovered he had previously trained at the same flight school where another known terrorist had attended. Investigators learned about his lessons at the Airman Flight school in Norman, Oklahoma where he had been deemed such a poor pilot that he had not been allowed to fly the small planes by himself. (Eggen 1-2-2002; Martin 1-5-2002) This is the same flight school, where Abdul Hakim Murad had trained in preparation for an attack on the CIA headquarters. This plan had been revealed in 1996 when Murad testified in Court during the trial of Ramzi Ahmed Yusef, the man who had been behind the 1993 bombing of the WTC. After 9-11, authorities discovered that several of the 9-11 hijackers had trained there. (Martin 1-5-2002; Shelon 5-18-2002; Lewis 5-30-2002)
- 4. Personal notes written by a Minneapolis agent had speculated that perhaps Moussaoui was planning to "fly something into the World Trade Center." Newsweek reported, "When agents learned, from French intelligence, that he had radical Islamic ties, they sought a nationalsecurity warrant to search his computer -- and got turned down. From his e-mail traffic they found he wanted to learn to fly a 747 from London's Heathrow to New York's JFK. The agents held 'brainstorming' sessions to try to figure out what targets might be en route. The agents were 'in a frenzy.' 'absolutely convinced he was planning to do something with a plane,' said a senior official" (cited in Isikoff 5-20-2002; see also Johnston 5-15-2002) During this brainstorming session, one of the agents wrote in the margins of his notes that perhaps Moussaoui was planning to "fly-something into the World Trade Center." (cited in Isikoff 5-20-2002; see also Johnston 5-15-2002; Cloud, Fields, and Power 5-20-2002) His notes were included in an internal report that did not leave the Minnesota office. (Cloud, Fields, and Power 5-20-2002)
- 5. Investigators were denied a warrant to search Moussaoui's computer hard drive. The request for a search warrant was handled by lawyers at FBI headquarters and other FBI officials, who denied the request citing insufficient evidence. (Rowley 5-21-2002; Cloud, Fields, and Power 5-20-2002; Eggen 5-27-2002) At the same time the FBI was trying to secure a warrant, the U.S. attorney's office was also attempting to receive permission to access Moussaoui's hard drive from the Justice Department, which also turned down the request. (Gordon 10-3-2002) Even more

interesting, the FBI office that was communicating with Minneapolis was the same one that had received the July 10 'Phoenix memo.' (CNN 5-27-2002; Martin 5-27-2002) According to a 13-page letter sent by senior FBI agent and general counsel in the Minneapolis office, Colleen Rowley, senior officials at FBI headquarters provided a formidable barrier to further investigating the Moussaoui. (Rowley 5-21-2002; Risen and Johnston 5-24-2002; Martin 5-27-2002; Meyers 5-28-2002; Eggen 5-27-2002) In fact the Minneapolis agent went so far as to accuse headquarters of altering the search warrant application. The New York Times reported, "Officials who have seen Ms. Rowley's letter say it accuses the supervisor of altering the application to play down the significance of information provided by French intelligence officials about Mr. Moussaoui's links to Islamic extremists," making "it all but impossible to convince the F.B.I.'s national security lawyers to pursue court authorization for the search." (Rowley 5-21-2002; Risen 5-24-2002; see also Lumkin 5-25-2002; Martin 5-27-2002; Eggen 5-27-2002)

- 6. The Minneapolis FBI office went behind the backs of their superiors to the CIA for help investigating Moussaoui. The New York Times reported, "Ms. Rowley contended. Ms. Rowley said Minneapolis agents became so frustrated by inaction at F.B.I. headquarters at one point that they went directly to the Central Intelligence Agency for help in building their case against Mr. Moussaoui. Going behind the backs of their superiors was a breach of bureau protocol, and officials at headquarters reprimanded the Minneapolis agents, the officials said." (Risen and Johnston 5-24-2002; see also Risen 5-24-2002; Cornwell 5-25-2002; Oliphant 6-2-2002) The AP received excerpts of Ms. Rowley's letter, which read, "When, in a desperate 11thhour measure to bypass the FBI HQ roadblock, the Minneapolis division undertook to directly notify the CIA's counter terrorist center, FBI HQ personnel chastised the Minneapolis agents for making the direct notification without their approval." (Rowley 5-21-2002; cited in Margasak and Solomon 5-24-2002; Martin 5-27-2002)
- 7. After the attacks, authorities searched his hard drive, which had important information. Immediately after the attacks the warrant was granted. Interestingly, the FBI was granted the search warrant based on information that did not include the intelligence that had been supplied by France (Rowley 5-21-2002). The files on the hard drive revealed information about jetliners, crop dusters, and wind currents (Eggen 1-2-2002; Martin 1-5-2002). Within hours, Moussaoui was traced to bin Laden (Gordon 5-19-2002) and linked to Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, two other 9-11 hijackers. (Gordon 5-19-2002; Isikoff and

- 8. Minneapolis FBI agent, Colleen Rowley, took issue with Mueller's assertion that had the Minneapolis office received the warrant that nothing could have been done to prevent the attacks. In her letter to Mueller, she wrote: "The official statement is now to the effect that even if the FBI had followed up on the Phoenix lead to conduct checks of flight schools and the Minneapolis request to search Moussaoui's personal effects and laptop, nothing would have changed and such actions certainly could not have prevented the terrorist attacks and resulting loss of life. With all due respect, this statement is as bad as the first! . . . I don't know how you or anyone at FBI Headquarters, no matter how much genius or prescience you may possess, could so blithely make this affirmation without anything to back the opinion up than your stature as FBI Director. The truth is, as with most predictions into the future, no one will ever know what impact, if any, the FBI's following up on those requests, would have had. Although I agree that it's very doubtful that the full scope of the tragedy could have been prevented, it's at least possible we could have gotten lucky and uncovered one or two more of the terrorists in flight training prior to September 11th, just as Moussaoui was discovered, after making contact with his flight instructors. It is certainly not beyond the realm of imagination to hypothesize that Moussaoui's fortuitous arrest alone, even if he merely was the 20th hijacker, allowed the hero passengers of Flight 93 to overcome their terrorist hijackers and thus spare more lives on the ground. And even greater casualties, possibly of our Nation's highest government officials, may have been prevented if Al Qaeda intended for Moussaoui to pilot an entirely different aircraft. There is, therefore at least some chance that discovery of other terrorist pilots prior to September 11th may have limited the September 11th attacks and resulting loss of life." (Rowley 5-20-2002; Martin 5-27-2002; Eggen 5-27-2002; Oliphant 6-2-2002) After the publication of a significant portion of Rowley's letter, Robert Mueller III admitted that had the FBI responded differently to the warnings, the 9-11 attacks might have been averted. (Lewis 5-30-2002; Oliphant 6-2-2002)
- 9. Immediately after the attacks, Minneapolis agents 'joked' that FBI headquarters must have spies or moles working for Osama bin Laden. In the endnotes of her letter, Colleen Rowley explained: "During the early aftermath of September 11th, when I happened to be recounting the pre-September 11th events concerning the Moussaoui investigation to other FBI personnel in other divisions or in FBI HQ, almost everyone's first question was 'Why? -- Why would an FBI agent(s) deliberately sabotage a case?" (I

know I shouldn't be flippant about this, but jokes were actually made that the key FBI HQ personnel had to be spies or moles, like Robert Hansen, who were actually working for Osama Bin Laden to have so undercut Minneapolis' effort.)" (Rowley 5-21-2002; Martin 5-27-2002; Meyer 5-28-2002).

21. August 23, 2001. CIA memo: the case of Kahlil Almihdar and Nawaf Alhamzi

On August 23, the CIA issued an urgent alert that put two men known to have ties to al Qaeda, Khalid Almihdar and Nawaf Alhamzi on a 'watch list.' Post 9-11 investigations revealed that the CIA had long been aware that these two hijackers were connected to al Qaeda and had entered the U.S. in January of 2000. It was further revealed that the CIA did not notify the FBI, INS, or the State Department at that time, but instead waited until just 19 days before the terrorist attacks. Here is a timeline of events relating to these two men:

- a. Late December of 1999. The CIA discovered through communications surveillance on an al Qaeda safe house in Yemen that Muslim radicals with ties to al Qaeda, including Kahlil Almihdar and Nawaf Alhamzi, would be meeting together in a condo in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The safe house was owned by the Yemeni bin Laden supporter, Ahmed al-Hada, who was the father-in-law of Kahlil Almihdar. The CIA notified Malaysian intelligence, the Special Branch, and requested that an agent follow and take pictures of the men during their stay in Kuala Lumpur. (Isikoff and Klaidman 6-10-2002; Becker and Johnston 6-3-2002; Scotsman 6-3-2002; Price 6-3-2002; Eggen and Pincus 6-4-2002)
- b. January 15, 2000. On January 15, shortly after the January 6 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (Almihdhar had obtained a multiple-entry visa) arrived at New York's JFK airport. While the CIA was immediately aware of Almihdhar's arrival, they reportedly did not learn of Alhazmi's presence until March 2000 when they received word from a foreign intelligence agency (Isikoff and Klaidman 6-10-2002; Becker and Johnston 6-3-2002; Scotsman 6-3-2002). Though the CIA reportedly passed on this intelligence to the FBI via e-mail (Risen 6-3-2002; Eggen and Pincus 6-4-2002), the correspondence left out key information, such as the fact that the two men had been linked to the Cole bombing and that they had visited the U.S. Moreover, the information was never relayed to the INS or the U.S. State Department (Risen 6-3-2002). The CIA just let them breeze right into the U.S. despite the fact that "as 2000 dawned, U.S. law-enforcement agencies were on red alert, certain that a bin Laden strike somewhere in the world could come at any moment." And once these two men were safely in the country, no government agency monitored their activities or their whereabouts (Isikoff and Klaidman 6-10-2002).
- c. <u>January 15, ????</u> Malaysian authorities continued to monitor the Kuala Lumpur condo, but notably, the CIA lost interest. *Newsweek* reported that had the CIA followed up in events in Malaysia, they would have been led to Zacarias Moussaoui. The magazine reported: "Had agents kept up the

surveillance, they might have observed another beneficiary of Sufaat's charity: Zacarias Moussaoui, who stayed there on his way to the United States later that year. The Malaysians say they were surprised by the CIA's lack of interest following the Kuala Lumpur meeting. 'We couldn't fathom it, really,' Rais Yatim, Malaysia's Legal Affairs minister, told NEWSWEEK. 'There was no show of concern." (Isikoff and Klaidman 6-10-2002)

d. <u>September 2000</u>. "Alhazmi opened a \$3,000 checking account at a Bank of America branch. The men also used their real names on driver's licenses, Social Security cards and credit cards. When Almihdhar bought a dark blue 1988 Toyota Corolla for \$3,000 cash, he registered it in his

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'The 9/11 Report One Year Later: A Citizen's Response

– Did They Get It Right?'

Panel:

Suspects and Plots: Osama bin Laden and US Intelligence

The 9/11 Terrorists: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Official Narrative

(c) Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed

Here, I will attempt to present a number of important facts and reports that fundamentally challenge the official account of the nature and identities of the alleged 9/11 hijackers, their relationship to al-Qaeda, and their activities as Islamic extremists. While no alternative theoretical explanation is offered, it must be noted that these facts constitute as yet unresolved anomalies that strike at the core of the official narrative.

Islamic Fundamentalists?

A variety of reports based on journalistic investigations and eye-witness testimonials provide a bizarre picture at odds with the conventional portrayal of the 9/11 hijackers as Islamic fundamentalists. Two key hijackers, Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, visited the popular Woodland Park Resort Hotel in the Philippines several times between 1998 and 2000 according to numerous local residents and hotel workers who recognized them from news photographs. They reportedly "drank whiskey with Philippine bargirls, dined at a restaurant that specializes in Middle Eastern cuisine and visited at least one of the local flight schools." Al-Shehhi threw a party with six or seven Arab friends in December 2000 at the Hotel according to former waitress Gina Marcelo. "They rented the open area by the swimming pool for 1,000 pesos," she recounts. "They drank Johnnie Walker Black Label whiskey and mineral water. They barbecued shrimp and onions. They came in big vehicles, and they had a lot of money. They all had girlfriends." But one big mistake they made was that unlike most foreign visitors, "[t]hey never tipped. If they did, I would not remember them so well." Victoria Brocoy, a chambermaid at the Woodland, recalls: "Many times I saw him let a girl go at the gate in the morning. It was always a different girl."

According to US investigators, five of the hijackers including Atta, Al-Shehhi, Nawaq Alhamzi, Ziad Jarrah, and Hani Hanjour visited Las Vegas at least six times between May and August 2001. The San Francisco Chronicle reports that here, they "engaged in some decidedly un-Islamic sampling of prohibited pleasures in America's reputed capital of moral corrosion," including drinking alcohol, gambling, and visiting strip-clubs. As the South Florida Sun Sentinel observed, the hijackers' frequent debauchery was at odds with the most basic tenets of Islam:

Three guys cavorting with lap dancers at the Pink Pony Nude Theater. Two others knocking back glasses of Stolichnaya and rum and Coke at a fish joint in Hollywood the weekend before committing suicide and mass murder. That might describe the behavior of several men who are suspects in Tuesday's terrorist attack, but it is not a picture of devout Muslims, experts say. Let alone that of religious zealots in their final days on Earth.

For instance, specialist in Islamic and Middle East studies Mahmoud Mustafa Ayoub, Professor of Religion at Temple University in Philadelphia, noted that the prohibition of alcohol, gambling, and sex outside marriage are Islam's most fundamental precepts: "It is incomprehensible that a person could drink and go to a strip bar one night, then kill themselves the next day in the name of Islam. People who would kill themselves for their faith would come from very strict Islamic ideology. Something here does not add up."

Similar reports abound regarding other al-Qaeda terrorists connected to 9/11. Even alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammad reportedly "met associates in karaoke bars and giant gogo clubs filled with mirrors, flashing lights and bikini-clad dancers," according to evidence collected by Philippine investigators:

He held meetings at four-star hotels. He took scuba-diving lessons at a coastal resort. When he wasn't engaged with the go-go dancers, he courted a Philippine dentist. Once, to impress her, he rented a helicopter and flew it over her office, then called her on his cell phone and told her to look up and wave.

Mohammad's al-Qaeda associates engaged in much the same behavior. They had local girlfriends and held a drinking party "to celebrate the anniversary of the 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 explosion over Lockerbie, Scotland."

Clearly, this pattern of debauchery is not by any standard commensurate with the strict requirements of al-Qaeda's brand of Islamic fundamentalism. As Professors Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner point out, al-Qaeda is "a radical tendency within a broader Islamic movement known as the Salafi movement...

The term Salafi is derived from the Arabic salaf, which means "to precede" and refers to the companions of the Prophet Muhammed. Because the salaf learned about Islam directly from the messenger of God, their example is an important illustration of piety and unadulterated religious practice. Salafis argue that centuries of syncretic cultural and popular religious rituals and interpretations distorted the purity of the message of God and that only by returning to the example of the prophet and his companions can Muslims achieve salvation. The label "Salafi" is thus used to connote "proper" religious adherence and moral legitimacy, implying that alternative understandings are corrupt deviations from the straight path of Islam.

Thus, although there are various schools of thought within Salafism—including al-Qaeda's violent jihadist interpretation—they all emphasize and indeed attempt to derive their legitimacy from the Salafist goal of "piety and unadulterated religious practice" based directly on the piety and practice of the Prophet.⁵ In this context, the depraved conduct of the 9/11 hijackers in terms of their routine violation of the most basic Islamic precepts contradicts al-Qaeda's strictly puritan Salafist philosophy.

The Takfir Paradigm

How to explain this anomaly? Western intelligence agencies have come up with one attempt at an answer. Time Magazine reports that intelligence officials claim that many al-Qaeda terrorists are "followers of an extremist Islamic ideology called Takfir wal Hijra (Anathema and Exile). That's bad news: by blending into host communities, Takfiris attempt to avoid suspicion. A French official says they come across as 'regular, fun-loving guys—but they'd slit your throat or bomb your building in a second." Another French official says that the goal of Takfir "is to blend into corrupt societies in order to plot attacks against them better. Members live together, will drink alcohol, eat during Ramadan, become smart dressers and ladies' men to show just how integrated they are."

However, this depiction of al-Qaeda and Takfir wal Hijra is thoroughly inaccurate. Takfir wal Hijra was the title given to a radical Islamic movement known as the Society of Muslims. The latter was founded in Egypt by Muslim Brotherhood member Shukri Mustafa after his release from prison in 1971. The group disintegrated after Mustafa was arrested and executed by the Egyptian government, but some of its followers went on to join other radical groups such as al-Jihad and/or fled to North Africa. Rather than attempting to integrate into modern society to carry out attacks as intelligence officials now claim, Takfiri ideology advocated the very opposite: "As contemporary society was infidel, he argued, Takfir would set up its own alternative community that would work, study and pray together.... Takfir declared that not only the regime but the society itself was infidel and under excommunication. This entailed... a personal withdrawal from society." Even Takfir's rival radical Islamic group in Egypt, Jama'at al-Jihad, known as the Society of Struggle, espoused such a harsh perspective of Islamic practice that it advocated as Islam's top priority "jihad against unbelievers—including 'Muslims' who did not observe the religion's requirements properly"—let alone endorsing in any manner a violation of those requirements.⁷

Indeed, according to the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), the fact that "some analysts treat the Takfirees as no different from the Al-Qaeda" is a mistake. Citing religious sources in Pakistan, SAAG observes that Takfir wal Hijra as it exists now "is one of the very few jihadi groups in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region which has refused to accept the leadership and the modus operandi of Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda...

According to them, it had unsuccessfully tried to assassinate him when he was living in the Sudan before the middle of 1996 when he shifted to Afghanistan. It had also reportedly issued a fatwa in 1999 calling for his assassination. Even though it's religious ideology is as extreme as that of bin Laden, if not more, its modus operandi differs in the sense it believes that before getting involved in a head-on confrontation with the US one should get rid of all US surrogates in the Islamic countries through targeted assassinations. It feels that bin Laden weakened the cause of the jihad against the US by prematurely taking the US head-on on 9/11 without first eliminating its surrogates in Pakistan and other countries of the Islamic world.

The Sunday Times similarly reported a month after 9/11 that Takfir "regards Osama bin Laden as an infidel who has sold out." The group's fundamentalism is so extreme that its members "have embarked on killing sprees in mosques against fellow Muslims in the belief that a pure Islamic state can be built only if the corrupt elements of the last one are wiped out." Takfir's enmity toward al-Qaeda is based on the perception that Osama bin Laden is "excessively liberal." In 1995, four Takfir members attempted to assassinate bin Laden at his home in Khartoum. Takfiris continue to be "angered" at bin Laden's leadership of a "compromised jihad." According to the Times, "Takfir denounces all but those who copy the behaviour of the prophet Muhammad as

infidels and promises to kill them." One senior Sudanese government source confirmed that Takfir "regard [bin Laden] as a sellout... the Takfir think that everything in contemporary Muslim society is corrupt and should be destroyed." Both Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri Mohammed, London-based clerics allegedly linked to al-Qaeda, have condemned Takfir and distanced al-Qaeda from the former.

Djamel Beghal and Kamel Daoudi—alleged UK-based terrorists arrested in September 2001 for plotting a series of spectacular terrorist assaults on Europe—were both supposed to be members of Takfir wal Hijra. But according to one Algerian in London who knew Beghal, integrating into Western culture by engaging in various acts of debauchery in violation of Islamic tenets was the last thing this alleged Takfiri would ever do: "Believe me, you do not want these people in your country... they will kill anybody, including their own family, if they are caught smoking or drinking." ¹⁰

Thus, the new scenario being proposed by Western intelligence officials to explain the patently un-Islamic behavior of the 9/11 hijackers is largely incoherent. Despite claims to the contrary, Takfir wal Hijra is aggressively opposed to al-Qaeda and its strict ideology is fundamentally incommensurate with the prospect of permitting defiance of Islamic rules under any circumstances. Furthermore, al-Qaeda is in turn staunchly opposed to Takfir. Therefore, the anomaly of the 9/11 hijackers persists: They clearly did not possess the conduct of hardened Islamic fundamentalists connected to al-Qaeda. So, who were they?

The State Department's Green Light for Terrorists

Al-Qaeda operatives were able to repeatedly leave and enter the United States despite being known terrorists. But according to journalist Joel Mowbray, they should have been fully barred from the country on the basis of their suspicious visa applications alone:

... expert analyses of the visa-application forms of 15 of the 9/11 terrorists (the other four applications could not be obtained), [show] all the applicants among the 15 reviewed should have been denied visas under then-existing law. Six separate experts who analyzed the simple, two-page forms came to the same conclusion: All of the visa applications they reviewed should have been denied on their face.

Among the experts who independently examined the terrorist visa applications of 14 Saudis and one from the UAE were four former consular officers, a current consular officer stationed in Latin America, and a senior official at the State Department's office of Consular Affairs (CA). All six experts "strongly agreed that even allowing for human error" the visa lapses were "inexplicable," and all the more so because "the State Department claims that at least 11 of the 15 were interviewed by consular officers." According to former consular officer Nikolai Wenzel, the State Department's issuance of the visas "amounts to criminal negligence." The terrorists' applications were "littered with red flags" and "significant amounts of missing information"—all of which were simply ignored. "Even to the untrained eye, it is easy to see why many of the visas should have been denied," observes Mowbray. "If the US State Department had followed the law, at least 15 of the 19 'dots' should have been denied visas — and they likely wouldn't have been in the United States on September 11, 2001."

How to explain this pattern of State Department law-breaking? Michael Springmann—former head of the Visa Bureau at the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, between 1987 and 1989—has thrown significant light on this phenomenon. Springmann, who has had 20 years of experience in the US government and is now a practicing lawyer in Washington DC, told BBC's Newsnight that: "In Saudi Arabia I was repeatedly ordered by high level State Dept officials to

issue visas to unqualified applicants. These were, essentially, people who had no ties either to Saudi Arabia or to their own country."¹²

In another interview with CBC's Radio One, he stated that CIA officials had consistently violated State Department regulations to issue visas to terrorists recruited to "fight against the then Soviets." There were "as many as a hundred" recruits, people "with no ties to any place in particular... Afghanistan was the end user of their facilities. They were coming to the US for training as terrorists. The countries that had supplied them did not want them back."

CBC: Does this demonstrate a relationship between the CIA and Osama Bin Laden dating back as far as 1987?

SPRINGMANN: That's right, and as you recall, they believe that this fellow Sheikh Abdurrahman who was tied to the first New York World Trade Center bombing had gotten his visa from a CIA case officer in the Sudan. And that the 15 or so people who came from Saudi Arabia to participate in the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon had gotten visas through the American consulate general in Jeddah.

CBC: So what does that suggest, that this pipeline was never rolled up, that it's still operating?

SPRINGMANN: Exactly. I thought that it had been, because I'd raised sufficient hell that I thought that they'd done it. I had complained to the Embassy in Riyadh, I had complained to diplomatic security in Washington, I had complained to the General Accounting Office, I had complained to the State Department Inspector-General's Office, I had complained to the Bureau of Consular Affairs at the State Department and apparently the reverberations from this were heard all over the State Department.

CBC: If what you say may be true, many of the terrorists who allegedly flew those planes into those targets, got their US visas through the CIA and your US consulate in Jeddah. That suggests a relationship ongoing as recently as obviously September. But what was the CIA presumably recruiting these people for as recently as September 11th? SPRINGMANN: That I don't know. And that's one of the things that I tried to find out through a series of Freedom of Information Act requests starting ten years ago. At the time the State Department and the CIA stonewalled my requests. They're still doing so.

CBC: If the CIA had a relationship with the people responsible for September 11th, are you suggesting therein that they are somehow complicit?

SPRINGMANN: Yes, either through omission or through failure to act.... By the attempts to cover me up and shut me down, this convinced me more and more that this was not a pipedream, this was not imagination.

 (\ldots)

CBC: But you're quite sure that Mohamed Atta and others had their visas issued in Jeddah?

SPRINGMANN: Well this is what I was told by reading an article in the Los Angeles Times.¹³

Indeed, between April 23 and June 29, 2001, thirteen of the hijackers obtained visas to come to United States based on identities they presented at the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. ¹⁴ But as noted by the former chief of the US Visa Bureau in Jeddah:

I had not been protesting fraud. What I was protesting was, in reality, an effort to bring recruits, rounded up by Osama bin Laden, to the US for terrorist training by the CIA.... The State Department did not run the Consulate in Jeddah. The CIA did. Of the roughly 20 Washington-dispatched staff there, I know for a certainty that only three people (including myself) had no ties, either professional or familial, to any of the US intelligence services. 15

It appears that the US government responded to Springmann's complaints not by rolling up the pipeline, but by widening it, despite increasing evidence of a Saudi connection to al-Qaeda. The St. Petersburg Times reports that although: "FBI agents complained that their Saudi counterparts hampered investigations into terror attacks, including a 1996 bombing on Dhahran that killed 19 US servicemen," rather than "tightening visa requirements, the US government made it easier for Saudi visitors to come to America." Only four months prior to 9/11 a new program "called US Visa Express" was introduced allowing Saudis "to arrange visas through 10 travel agencies—often without coming to the US Embassy or consulate for interviews." 16

These preposterous and illegal measures were instituted the same time that the intelligence community was on alert for an imminent al-Qaeda attack. Indeed, as Mowbray reports, at least 3 Saudis "among the last of the Sept. 11 homicide hijackers to enter this country didn't visit a US embassy or consulate to get their visas; they went to a travel agent, where they only submitted a short, two-page form and a photo," a method made possible by "Visa Express." One senior Consular Affairs official described the program as "an open-door policy for terrorists," since "Saudi Arabia... is the only country with such special visa privileges whose citizens pose a known terrorist risk." 17

While the government has exploited this phenomenon to argue for the necessity of pushing through draconian legislation to tighten borders, in fact existing law was perfectly capable of protecting the United States—but was violated with impunity by the State Department. The continuation of such policies is hard to understand given that Springmann himself had warned the State Department repeatedly that unqualified applicants were being issued US visas by the CIA.

US Military Training: Atta, Abdulaziz Alomari, Saeed Alghamdi, and Others

Not only did the State Department seem to go out of its way to allow the hijackers to enter the United States, many of them went on to gain access to secure US military installations, where they received various forms of training. According to reports in *Newsweek*, the *Washington Post*, and the *New York Times*, US military officials confirmed to the FBI "that five of the alleged hijackers received training in the 1990s at secure US military installations." Newsweek further notes that US military training of foreign students is routine, but occurs with the authorization of both the US military and the respective government, as well as on condition of the latter's payment:

US military sources have given the FBI information that suggests five of the alleged hijackers of the planes that were used in Tuesday's terror attacks received training at secure US military installations in the 1990s. Another of the alleged hijackers may have been trained in strategy and tactics at the Air War College in Montgomery, Ala., said another high-ranking Pentagon official. The fifth man may have received language instruction at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Tex. Both were former Saudi Air Force pilots who had come to the United States, according to the Pentagon source....

NEWSWEEK visited the base early Saturday morning, where military police confirmed that the address housed foreign military flight trainees.... It is not unusual for foreign nationals to train at US military facilities. A former Navy pilot told NEWSWEEK that during his years on the base, "we always, always, always trained other countries' pilots. When I was there two decades ago, it was Iranians. The shah was in power. Whoever the country du jour is, that's whose pilots we train."

Candidates begin with "an officer's equivalent of boot camp," he said. "Then they would put them through flight training." The US has a long-standing agreement with Saudi Arabia—a key ally in the 1990-91 gulf war—to train pilots for its National Guard. Candidates are trained in air combat on several Army and Navy bases. Training is paid for by Saudi Arabia. 19

Knight Ridder news service provided more specific details of the findings. Mohamed Atta had attended International Officers School at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama; Abdulaziz Alomari had attended Aerospace Medical School at Brooks Air Force base in Texas; and Saeed Alghamdi had been to the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. Citing sources in the US Defense Department, the New York Times confirmed the same. A Washington Post report further revealed that as many as "four of 19 suspected hijackers may have participated during the 1990s" in a "flight training program for foreign military trainees" at Pensacola Naval Air Station. "Two of 19 suspects named by the FBI, Saeed Alghamdi and Ahmed Alghamdi, have the same names as men listed at a housing facility for foreign military trainees at Pensacola. Two others, Hamza Alghamdi and Ahmed Alnami, have names similar to individuals listed in public records as using the same address inside the base."

The key problem here is that the hijackers would have required a certain degree of high-level security clearance to train at these military installations, and would have had their backgrounds thoroughly checked. But Mohamed Atta, for example, was on a terrorist watch list since 1986. How could this lapse have occurred?

Not long after these embarrassing reports of US military ties to al-Qaeda terrorists, the US Air Force issued an official statement of denial, arguing that "the name matches may not necessarily mean the students were the hijackers because of discrepancies in ages and other personal data." Although some terrorists "had similar names to foreign alumni of US military courses," these biographical discrepancies "indicate we are probably not talking about the same people." But the government has refused to substantiate the denial, by preventing the publication of the relevant biographical data that would actually prove the discrepancies. On September 16, 2001, news reports asserted that: "Officials would not release ages, country of origin or any other specific details of the three individuals"—and have refused to do so to date.

The most pertinent illustration of the duplicity of official explanations, however, is that even Senate inquiries were simultaneously stonewalled by government officials from three agencies and departments—the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and the FBI. When Newsweek reported that three of the hijackers were trained at the secure Pensacola Naval Station in Florida, Senator Bill Nelson faxed Attorney-General John Ashcroft demanding to know if it was true. On September 17, 2001, Senator Nelson also "asked the Pentagon to confirm or refute reports that two of the terrorists were listed at a housing facility for foreign military officers at a Pensacola Florida Air Base." By September 21, Senator Nelson "was informed that the FBI could neither say 'yes' or 'no,'" according to Nelson's press office. Apparently, the bureau was still "investigating any connection to the military facility." By October 30, 2001, journalist Daniel Hopsicker—who has been a producer at PBS Wall Street Week, an executive producer of

NBC TV's Global Business, and an investigative reporter for NBC News—contacted Senator Nelson's office and was told that: "In the wake of those reports we asked about the Pensacola Naval Air Station but we never got a definitive answer from the Justice Department. So we asked the FBI for an answer 'if and when' they could provide us one. Their response to date has been that they are trying to sort through something complicated and difficult."²⁴ What was so complicated and difficult about confirming the identity of the military trainees?

Curiously, in complete contradiction to the stance of other federal agencies, the US Air Force's public position was that the matter was in fact solved, case closed. Hopsicker subsequently queried a major in the US Air Force's Public Affairs Office who "was familiar with the question." She explained: "Biographically, they're not the same people. Some of the ages are 20 years off." But when questioned to substantiate the specific discrepancy, she was forced to admit that there was no discrepancy. According to Hopsicker: "Some' of the ages? We told her we were only interested in Atta. Was she saying that the age of the Mohamed Atta who attended the Air Force's International Officer's School at Maxwell Air Force Base was different from the terrorist Atta's age as reported? Um, er, no, the major admitted." Hopsicker asked if he could contact the other alleged "Mohamed Atta" at the International Officer's School at Maxwell Air Force Base, who was purportedly confused with the chief 9/11 hijacker, so that he could confirm that they were indeed two different individuals. The major declined without explanation, stating that she did not "think you're going to get that information." 25

But Hopsicker was not finished. In an interview with the Pentagon, Hopsicker was told by a spokesman for the US Defense Department that some terrorists did attend US military installations, but declined to release any further details:

Despite earlier denials, terrorists in the Sept. 11 attacks received training at secure US military bases, a Defense Department spokesman admitted.... In an interview with a reporter questioning the vaguely-worded Sept 16 Pentagon denial, the Defense Dept spokesman was asked to explain the particulars of fuzzy statements in which officials said "name matches may not necessarily mean the students were the hijackers," and that discrepancies in biographical data indicate "we are probably not talking about the same people."

Pressed repeatedly to provide specifics, the spokesperson finally admitted, "I do not have the authority to tell you who (which terrorists) attended which schools." So it appears certain that at least some of the previous denials have been rendered inoperative, and that a list exists in the Defense Dept which names Sept 11 terrorists who received training at US military facilities, a list the Pentagon is in no hurry to make public. 26

How did al-Qaeda terrorists receive clearance for training at secure US military facilities and for what purpose?

Mohamed Atta

The US response to Mohamed Atta, the lead 9/11 hijacker, is an extraordinary example of the extent to which all the 9/11 hijackers were under the extensive surveillance of the US intelligence community. The German public TV channel, ARD, reported on November 23, 2001, that Mohamed Atta was subject to telephone monitoring by the Egyptian secret service, thus discovering that Atta had made at least one recent visit to Afghanistan from his home in Hamburg, Germany. The FBI had also been monitoring Atta's movements for several months in 2000, when he traveled several times from Hamburg to Frankfurt and bought large quantities of chemicals potentially usable for building explosives. Atta's name had also been mentioned in a Hamburg phone call between Islamic fundamentalists monitored by the German police in 1999.²⁷

In January 2001, Atta was permitted reentry into the United States after a trip to Germany, despite being in violation of his visa status. He had landed in Miami on January 10 on a flight from Madrid on a tourist visa—yet he had told immigration inspectors that he was taking flying lessons in the US, for which an M-1 student visa is strictly required. Jeanne Butterfield, Executive Director of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, points out that: "Nine times out of 10, they would have told him to go back and file [for that status] overseas. You're not supposed to come in as a visitor for pleasure and go to work or school." PBS' Frontlines also takes note of "The failure of the INS to stop the attack's ringleader, Mohamed Atta, from entering the US three times on a tourist visa in 2001, even though officials knew the visa had expired in 2000 and Atta had violated its terms by taking flight lessons."

This failure should be evaluated in context with the fact that Atta had been under FBI surveillance for stockpiling bomb-making materials. Furthermore, Canadian TV reported that Atta had already been implicated in a terrorist bombing in Israel, with the information passed on to the United States before he was first issued his tourist visa. As Ken Garcia of the San Francisco Chronicle notes:

I realize that many people can fly under the radar of the nation's security network, but I didn't really think that they would include a number of international terrorists who were known to the FBI, the CIA, the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service as well as numerous police agencies in the ballot-challenged state of Florida... at least one of the suicidal hijackers, Mohamed Atta, managed to travel in and out of the United States on an expired visa. This despite the fact that Atta was on the government's watch list of suspected terrorists and had been since 1986 when he was implicated in a bus bombing attack in Israel.

Since Atta apparently flew under his own name on his many jaunts to Spain and Germany and back to the United States, you'd presumably think that someone in the FBI, CIA, State Department or the INS might have noticed his comings and goings.³¹

Yet despite his terrorist connections—and despite being on a US government terrorist watch list since 1986—Atta was still allowed into the United States freely, and made repeated trips to Europe, each time returning to the US to be admitted by US customs and immigration without obstruction—not because visa regulations were lax, but because they were simply repeatedly violated. The London Observer notes in surprise that Atta:

... was under surveillance between January and May last year after he was reportedly observed buying large quantities of chemicals in Frankfurt, apparently for the production of explosives and for biological warfare.... The US agents reported to have trailed Atta are said to have failed to inform the German authorities about their investigation. The disclosure that Atta was being trailed by police long before 11 September raises the question why the attacks could not have been prevented with the man's arrest.³²

In summary, despite being well known to authorities, Mohamed Atta seems to have led a rather charmed life. Although listed since 1986 on the State Department's terrorist watch list, he was repeatedly permitted to enter, leave, and return to the US freely. He had been under surveillance by US agents between January and May 2000 due to his suspicious purchase of large amounts of chemicals, which might be used to make explosives. In January 2001 he was detained by INS agents at Miami International Airport for 57 minutes due to previously overstaying a visa and failing to produce a proper visa to enter the US to train at a Florida flight school. But that did not

stop him. Despite the FBI's longstanding concern that terrorists might be attending flight schools in the US, Atta was allowed to enroll in the Florida flight school. By April 2001, he was stopped by police for driving without a license. He failed to show up in court in May and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. But that did not stop him either, because the warrant was never executed—although he was subsequently arrested for drunk driving on two more occasions. Throughout this period in the US, Atta never made any attempt to operate under an alias, traveling, living, and studying at the flight school under his real name.³³ Stranger still, Atta was in regular email contact with current and former employees of major US defense contractors, as revealed by a regular email list of some 40 individuals he maintained, discovered by the FBI in September 2001. One of the defense contractors is "a Canadian company called Virtual Prototypes, whose website touts the fact that the firm helped prototype the avionics instruments in the F-15 jet fighter, the F-22 Raptor, the B2 bomber and the Apache Longbow, among others."³⁴

It is hard to interpret this sequence of events in a benign light. In short, it seems to be an unavoidable—if inexplicable—conclusion that the US government knowingly and repeatedly granted free passage to a confirmed terrorist to enter the United States and undergo flight training. As the BBC observed: "The evidence... reinforces concerns that the international intelligence community may have known more about Atta before September 11 than was previously thought, but had failed to act." The BBC's conclusion is buttressed by revelations that US intelligence had not ceased monitoring Mohamed Atta's activities when he entered the United States. According to the Miami Herald: "A secretive US eavesdropping agency monitored telephone conversations before Sept. 11 between the suspected commander of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and the alleged chief hijacker." According to anonymous US officials "the conversations between Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Mohamed Atta were intercepted by the National Security Agency, or NSA, an intelligence agency that monitors and decodes foreign communications...

The officials declined to disclose the nature of the discussions between Mohammed, a known leader of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network who is on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list, and Atta, who is believed to have piloted one of the planes that hit the World Trade Center after honing his flying skills at a Venice, Fla., aviation school. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is believed to be hiding in Pakistan.... The senior intelligence official said that when the NSA monitored their conversations, Mohammed was overseas and Atta was in the United States.

Mohammed was included on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorist List when it was published in October because he had been indicted on charges of being involved in a failed 1995 plot [i.e. Project Bojinka] to bomb 11 US airliners flying over the Pacific Ocean on a single day. The US Justice Department has offered a \$25 million reward for him.³⁶

Notably, the *Herald* also points out that: "The NSA is prohibited by law from monitoring calls to and from the United States without special court orders." In other words, the monitoring of Atta's communications could only occur with special high-level legal approval sought by either the CIA or the FBI.

It should be noted that according to US counterterrorism officials, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—on the most wanted list—was the key operational planner behind the 9/11 attacks. His conversations with Atta, monitored by the NSA, presumably would have revealed extensive details of the unfolding terror plot. Indeed, the London *Independent* reports that: "Officials say that Mr. Mohammed received a telephone call from Mohammed Atta, the hijackers' ringleader, on 10 September. Intelligence officials who monitored and then translated that conversation

believe that using coded language, Mr. Mohammed gave Mr. Atta the final approval to launch the strikes."³⁸

Conclusions

The 9/11 hijackers were clearly not Islamic extremists. It is difficult to see how this fact fits with the conventional assumption that they were devout members of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda. Furthermore and/or alternatively, it is difficult to see how, if they indeed were members of al-Qaeda, how the conventional depiction of al-Qaeda as a network of devout, militant Islamic extremists can be maintained given their distinctively un-Islamic conduct.

The question arises as to who these people were, and/or alternatively what was the nature of this apparent al-Qaeda cell? The official narrative as it stands cannot resolve this problem. The question is exacerbated in light of the fact that the majority of the 9/11 hijackers repeatedly entered and re-entered the United States on blatantly fraudulent visas, supplied by the US consulate in Jeddah, which has according to reliable sources been traditionally used by the CIA. Worse still, many of these hijackers while in the United States somehow managed to obtain high-level security clearance to train at several US military installations. This occurred even though most of the hijackers — I have given only one example here that of Mohamed Atta - were known to the US intelligence community, placed under extensive surveillance, and even placed on terrorist watch lists. For further examples of other hijackers, please see my book, *The War on Truth*. In summary, then, these individuals were simultaneously connected to both the US military and al-Qaeda, moved in and out of the United States on fraudulent and invalid visas with impunity while often on terrorist watch lists, were almost continuously monitored by intelligence agencies, and conducted themselves in a manner in flat contradiction to the strict precepts of al-Qaeda puritanism.

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August 1, 2004

Thomas Kean, Chairman
National Committee on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street, SW
Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407

Dear Chairman Kean:

It has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on September 11; during which time we, the people, have been placed under a constant threat of terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our daily lives. Your commission, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, was created by law to investigate "facts and circumstances related to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" and to "provide recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism", and has now issued its "9/11 Commission Report". You are now asking us to pledge our support for this report, its recommendations, and implementation of these recommendations, with our trust and backing, our tax money, our security, and our lives. Unfortunately, I find your report seriously flawed in its failure to address serious intelligence issues that I am aware of, which have been confirmed, and which as a witness to the commission, I made you aware of. Thus, I must assume that other serious issues that I am not aware of were in the same manner omitted from your report. These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your report and therefore on its conclusions and recommendations. Considering what is at stake, our national security, we are entitled to demand answers to unanswered questions, and to ask for clarification of issues that were ignored and/or omitted from the report. I, Sibel Edmonds, a concerned American Citizen, a former FBI translator, a whistleblower, a witness for a United States Congressional investigation, a witness and a plaintiff for the Department of Justice Inspector General investigation, and a witness for your own 9/11 Commission investigation, request your answers to, and your public acknowledgement of, the following questions and issues:

After the terrorist attacks of September 11 we, the translators at the FBI's largest and most important translation unit, were told to slow down, even stop, translation of critical information related to terrorist activities so that the FBI could present the United States Congress with a record of 'extensive backlog of untranslated documents', and justify its request for budget and staff increases. While FBI agents from various field offices were desperately seeking leads and suspects, and completely depending on FBI HQ and its language units to provide them with needed translated information, hundreds of translators were being told by their administrative supervisors not to translate and to let the work pile up (please refer to the CBS-60 Minutes transcript dated October 2002, and provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This issue has been confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Please refer to Senator Grassley and Senator Leahy's letters during the summer of 2002, provided to your investigators in January-

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February 2004). This confirmed report has been reported to be substantiated by the Department of Justice Inspector General Report (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).

Today, almost three years after 9/11, and more than two years since this information has been confirmed and made available to our government, the administrators in charge of language departments of the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of the information front lines of the FBI's Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence efforts. Your report has omitted any reference to this most serious issue, has foregone any accountability what so ever, and your recommendations have refrained from addressing this issue, which when left un-addressed will have even more serious consequences. This issue is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and this serious issue despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish Translator, was hired by the FBI after September 11, and was placed in charge of translating the most sensitive information related to terrorists and criminals under the Bureau's investigation. Melek Can Dickerson was granted Top Secret Clearance, which can be granted only after conducting a thorough background investigation. Melek Can Dickerson used to work for semi-legit organizations that were the FBI's targets of investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going relationships with two individuals who were FBI's targets of investigation. For months Melek Can Dickerson blocked all-important information related to these semilegit organizations and the individuals she and her husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of documents related to these targets as 'Not Pertinent.' Melek Can Dickerson attempted to prevent others from translating these documents important to the FBI's investigations and our fight against terrorism. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor, Mike Feghali, took hundreds of pages of top-secret sensitive intelligence documents outside the FBI to unknown recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor, forged signatures on top-secret documents related to certain 9/11 detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and reported to FBI management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to continue the translation of sensitive intelligence received by the FBI, and to maintain her Top Secret Clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI management and administrators decided that it would not look good for the Bureau if this security breach and espionage case was investigated and made public, especially after going through Robert Hanssen's case (FBI spy scandal). This case (Melek Can Dickerson) was confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Please refer to Senator Leahy and Grassley's letters dated June 19 and August 13, 2002, and Senator Grassley's statement on CBS-60 Minutes in October 2002, provided to your investigators

in January-February 2004). This Dickerson incident received major coverage by the press (Please refer to media background provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). According to Director Mueller, the Inspector General criticized the FBI for failing to adequately pursue this espionage report regarding Melek Can Dickerson (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and additional documents. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).

Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to the FBI, and more than two years since this information was confirmed by the United States Congress and reported by the press, these administrators in charge of FBI personnel security and language departments in the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of translation quality and translation departments' security. Melek Can Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation hastily left the United States in 2002, and the case still remains uninvestigated criminally. Not only does the supervisor facilitating these criminal conducts remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to supervising Arabic language units of the FBI's Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence investigations. Your report has omitted these significant incidents, has foregone any accountability what so ever, and your recommendations have refrained from addressing this serious information security breach and highly likely espionage issue. This issue needs to be investigated and criminally prosecuted. The translation of our intelligence is being entrusted to individuals with loyalties to our enemies. Important 'chit-chats' and 'chatters' are being intentionally blocked. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

Over three years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned by Osama Bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama Bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting 4-5 major cities, 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the United States, 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few months. The agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism, Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington Field Office, by filing "302" forms, and the translator translated and documented this information. No action was taken by the Special Agent in Charge, and after 9/11 the agents and the translators were told to 'keep quiet' regarding this issue. The translator who was present during the session with the FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to Director

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Mueller in writing, and later to the Department of Justice Inspector General. The press reported this incident, and in fact the report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004 stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information was received in April 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to Director Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the Commission never raised this particular issue with him during the hearing (Please refer to Chicago Tribune article, dated July 21, 2004). Mr. Sarshar reported this issue to your investigators on February 12, 2004, and provided them with specific dates, location, witness names, and the contact information for that particular Iranian asset and the two special agents who received the information (Please refer to the tape-recorded testimony provided to your investigators during a 2.5 hours testimony by Mr. Sarshar on February 12, 2004). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents I had seen. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). Mr. Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice Inspector General with specific information regarding this issue (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).

After almost three years since September 11, many officials still refuse to admit to having specific information regarding the terrorists' plans to attack the United States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the 9/11 attacks, specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and their possible link to terrorist activities against the United States. Four months prior to the terrorist attacks the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific information regarding the 'use of airplanes', 'major US cities as targets', and 'Osama Bin Laden issuing the order.' Coleen Rowley likewise reported that specific information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC, and the FBI Washington Field Office, in Washington DC. Yet, your report claims that not having a central place where all intelligence could be gathered as one of the main factors in our intelligence failure. Why did your report choose to exclude the information regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarshar from its timeline of missed opportunities? Why was this significant incident not mentioned; despite the public confirmation by the FBI, witnesses provided to your investigators, and briefings you received directly? Why did you surprise even Director Mueller by refraining from asking him questions regarding this significant incident and lapse during your hearing (Please remember that you ran out of questions during your hearings with Director Mueller and AG John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a 'time limit' excuse)? How can budget increases address and resolve these problems and failure to follow up by mid-level bureaucratic management at FBI Headquarters? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

Over two years ago, and after two 'unclassified' sessions with FBI officials, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to Director Mueller, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine regarding the existence of unqualified translators in charge of translating high level sensitive intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen, a Turkish translator, had been given a job as an FBI translator,

despite the fact that he had failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin could not understand or speak even elementary level English. He had failed English proficiency tests and did not even score sufficiently in the target language. Still, Kevin Taskesen was hired, not due to lack of other qualified translator candidates, but because his wife worked in FBI Headquarters as a language proficiency exam administrator. Almost everybody in FBI Headquarters and the FBI Washington Field Office knew about Kevin. Yet, Kevin was given the task of translating the most sensitive terrorist related information, and he was sent to Guantanamo Bay to translate the interrogation of and information for all Turkic language detainees (Turkish, Uzbeks, Turkmen, etc.). The FBl was supposed to be trying to obtain information regarding possible future attack plans from these detainees, and yet, the FBI knowingly sent unqualified translators to gather and translate this information. Further, these detainees were either released or detained or prosecuted based on information received and translated by unqualified translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Senator Grassley and Senator Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen's case (Please refer to Senate letters and documents provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). CBS-60 Minutes showed Kevin's picture and stated his name as one of the unqualified translators sent to Guantanamo Bay, and as a case confirmed by the FBI (Please refer to CBS-60 Minutes transcript provided to your investigators). Department of Justice Inspector General had a detailed account of these problems (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).

After more than two years since Kevin Taskesen's case was publicly confirmed, and after almost two years since CBS-60 Minutes broadcasted Taskesen's case, Kevin Taskesen remains in his position, as a sole Turkish and Turkic language translator for the FBI Washington Field Office. After admitting that Kevin Taskesen was not qualified to perform the task of translating sensitive intelligence and investigation of terrorist activities, the FBI still keeps him in charge of translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those individuals in the FBI's hiring department and those who facilitated the hiring of unqualified translators due to nepotism/cronyism are still in those departments and remain in their positions. Yet, your report does not mention this case, or these chronic problems within the FBI translation departments, and within the FBI's hiring and screening departments. The issue of accountability for those responsible for these practices that endangers our national security is not brought up even once in your report. This issue, as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve the intentional continuation of ineptitude and incompetence by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

In October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11 attack, an agent from a (city name omitted) field office, re-sent a certain document to the FBI

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Washington Field Office, so that it could be re-translated. This Special Agent, in light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, rightfully believed that, considering his target of investigation (the suspect under surveillance), and the issues involved, the original translation might have missed certain information that could prove to be valuable in the investigation of terrorist activities. After this document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office and retranslated verbatim, the field agent's hunch appeared to be correct. The new translation revealed certain information regarding blueprints, pictures, and building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas. It also revealed certain illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the Middle East, through network contacts and bribery. However, after the re-translation was completed and the new significant information was revealed, the unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali, decided NOT to send the re-translated information to the Special Agent who had requested it. Instead, this supervisor decided to send this agent a note stating that the translation was reviewed and that the original translation was accurate. This supervisor stated that sending the accurate translation would hurt the original translator and would cause problems for the FBI language department. The FBI agent requesting the retranslation never received the accurate translation of that document, I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the name and date of this particular investigation, and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). This information was also provided to the Department of Justice Inspector General (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).

Only one month after the catastrophic events of September 11; while many agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and information, and to investigate those responsible for the attacks, those with possible connections to the attack, and those who might be planning possible future attacks; the bureaucratic administrators in the FBI's largest and most important translation unit were covering up their past failures, blocking important leads and information, and jeopardizing on going terrorist investigations. The supervisor involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was in charge of certain important Middle Eastern languages within the FBI Washington Field Office, and had a record of previous misconducts. After this supervisor's several severe misconducts were reported to the FBI's higher-level management, after his conducts were reported to the Inspector General's Office, to the United States Congress, and to the 9/11 Commission, he was promoted to include the FBI's Arabic language unit under his supervision. Today this supervisor, Mike Feghali, remains in the FBI Washington Field Office and is in charge of a language unit receiving those chitchats that our color-coded threat system is based upon. Yet your report contains zero information regarding these systemic problems that led us to our failure in preventing the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In your report, there are no references to individuals responsible for hindering past and current investigations, or those who are willing to compromise our security and our lives for their career advancement and security. This issue, as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why does your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite all the evidence and briefings you received? Why does your report adamantly refrain from

assigning any accountability to any individuals responsible for our past and current failures? How can budget increases address and resolve these intentional acts committed by self-serving career civil servants? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing information/intelligence within intelligence agencies and between intelligence agencies. To this date the public has not been told of intentional blocking of intelligence, and has not been told that certain information, despite its direct links, impacts and ties to terrorist related activities, is not given to or shared with Counterterrorism units, their investigations, and countering terrorism related activities. This was the case prior to 9/11, and remains in effect after 9/11. If Counterintelligence receives information that contains money laundering, illegal arms sale, and illegal drug activities, directly linked to terrorist activities; and if that information involves certain nations, certain semi-legit organizations, and ties to certain lucrative or political relations in this country, then, that information is not shared with Counterterrorism, regardless of the possible severe consequences. In certain cases, frustrated FBI agents cited 'direct pressure by the State Department,' and in other cases 'sensitive diplomatic relations' is cited. The Department of Justice Inspector General received detailed and specific information and evidence regarding this issue (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and the names of certain U.S. officials involved in these transactions and activities. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).

After almost three years the American people still do not know that thousands of lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of 'protecting certain foreign business relations.' The victims family members still do not realize that information and answers they have sought relentlessly for over two years has been blocked due to the unspoken decisions made and disguised under 'safeguarding certain diplomatic relations.' Your report did not even attempt to address these unspoken practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed under any gag. Your hearings did not include questions regarding these unspoken and unwritten policies and practices. Despite your full awareness and understanding of certain criminal conduct that connects to certain terrorist related activities, committed by certain U.S. officials and high-level government employees, you have not proposed criminal investigations into this conduct, although under the laws of this country you are required to do so. How can budget increases address and resolve these problems, when some of them are caused by unspoken practices and unwritten policies? How can a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, override these unwritten policies and unspoken practices incompatible with our national security?

Sing Examples

I know for a fact that problems regarding intelligence translation cannot be brushed off as minor problems among many significant problems. Translation units are the frontline in gathering, translating, and disseminating intelligence. A warning in advance of the next terrorist attack may, and probably will, come in the form of a message or document in a foreign language that will have to be translated. That message may be given to the translation unit headed and supervised by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down, even stops, translations for the purpose of receiving budget increases for his department, who has participated in certain criminal activities and security breaches, and who has been engaged in covering up failures and criminal conducts within the department, so it may never be translated in time if ever. That message may go to Kevin Taskesen, or another unqualified translator; so it may never be translated correctly and be acted upon. That message may go to a sympathizer within the language department; so it may never be translated fully, if at all. That message may come to the attention of an agent of a foreign organization who works as a translator in the FBI translation department, who may choose to block it; so it may never get translated. If then an attack occurs, which could have been prevented by acting on information in that message, who will tell family members of the new terrorist attack victims that nothing more could have been done? There will be no excuse that we did not know, because we do know.

I am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within the FBI's translation unit during the most crucial times after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in light of my first hand knowledge of certain problems and cases within the Bureau's language units, and in light of what has already been established as facts. As you are fully aware, the facts, incidents, and problems cited in this letter are by NO means based upon personal opinion or un-verified allegations. As you are fully aware, these issues and incidents were found confirmed by a Senior Republican Senator, Charles Grassley, and a Senior Democrat Senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know, according to officials with direct knowledge of the Department of Justice Inspector General's report on my allegations, 'none of my allegations were disproved' As you are fully aware, even FBI officials 'confirmed all my allegations and denied none' during their unclassified meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago. However, neither your commission's hearings, nor your commission's five hundred sixty seven-page report, nor your recommendations include these serious issues, major incidents, and systemic problems. Your report's coverage of FBI translation problems consists of a brief microscopic footnote (Footnote #25). Yet, your commission is geared to start aggressively pressuring our government to hastily implement your measures and recommendations based upon your incomplete and deficient report.

In order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In order to correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into account all visible symptoms. Your Commission's investigations, hearings, and report have chosen not to consider many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing 'visible', because these symptoms have been long recognized by experts from the intelligence community and have been written about in the press. I am emphasizing 'visible' because the few specific symptoms I provided you with in this letter have been confirmed and publicly acknowledged.

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During its many hearings your commission chose not to ask the questions necessary to unveil the true symptoms of our failed intelligence system. Your Commission intentionally bypassed these severe symptoms, and chose not to include them in its-five hundred and sixty seven-page report. Now, without a complete list of our failures pre 9/11, without a comprehensive examination of true symptoms that exist in our intelligence system, without assigning any accountability what so ever, and therefore, without a sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is attempting to divert attention from the real problems, and to prescribe a cure through hasty and costly measures. It is like attempting to put a gold-lined expensive porcelain cap over a deeply decayed tooth with a rotten root, without first treating the root, and without first cleaning/shaving the infected tooth.

Respectfully,

Sibel D. Edmonds

CC: Senate Judiciary Committee CC: Senate Intelligence Committee

CC: House Government Reform Committee

CC: Family Steering Committee

CC: Press

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY 4TH DISTRICT, GEORGIA

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES



Congress of the United States House of Representatives

July 19, 2005

Washington, DC 20515-1004

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DID THE 9/11 COMMISSION GET IT RIGHT?

A Briefing on the Unanswered Questions, Omissions and Recommendations

Dear Colleague,

Please join me on Friday, July 22nd, from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm in the Caucus Room, 345 Cannon HOB, for an all-day briefing on outstanding and still unanswered questions about the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

This will be a chance for you and your staff and legislative assistants to hear critical and informed testimony about the 9/11 Commission's Final Report on the first anniversary of its release. If you would like to participate and have the opportunity to pose questions to the panelists, please contact my office to RSVP at (202) 225-1605 as soon as possible.

The briefing will begin with victim family members presenting their 'Report Card' on the 9/11 Commission and discussing the many unanswered questions that still remain. Following this we will hear from experts speaking on the weaknesses of the 9/11 Commission's process and conclusions, and the serious errors in or omissions absent from the Commission's Final Report.

After lunch, there will be three panels offering a critical examination of the Report's recommendations in the areas of foreign policy, domestic policy and intelligence reform. Some panelists may offer alternative recommendations that deserve our consideration.

A Zogby Poll of August 2004 indicated that less than two in five (36%) believe that the 9/11 Commission had 'answered all the important questions' and two in three (66%) called for another full investigation of the 'still unanswered questions' by Congress. Given this level of public skepticism, should Congress be content to accept the 9/11 Commission's conclusions and recommendations as the 'final' word on the investigation into the murder of 3,000 Americans?

Please come and hear from a diverse collection of family members and experts whose questions and criticisms have often gone unheeded testifying as to why Congress can not afford to close the

With warmest regards I remain,

Rep. C nthia McKinney





Is Playing Paintball and Firing Legal Guns Terrorism? Three Disturbing Convictions Strongly Suggest Discrimination Against Muslim Americans By ELAINE CASSEL

Thursday, Mar. 25, 2004

On March 5, in federal district court in Alexandria, Virginia, Judge Leonie Brinkema delivered her verdict in the case of three American citizens -- Masoud Khan, 32, Seifullah Chapman, 31, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem, 35 -- who were charged with participating in a conspiracy to aid and abet terrorism. (The three had waived their right to a jury trial.)

Brinkema found the three men guilty. As a result of the finding of being labeled "terrorists," the men now face prison terms of fifty to one hundred years.

Yet plainly, these men are no terrorists, as I will explain below. Instead, defense attorneys have made a convincing case that the men were indicted and convicted primarily because they are Muslims.

Even the Government Did Not Initially See This as a Terrorism Case

You need not take my word for the fact that these men weren't terrorists. Take the government's word, instead.

According to a report in a June 28, 2003 Washington Post article, Michael E. Rolince, in charge of the Washington FBI field office, conceded that the government had no evidence of specific plots against U.S. targets at home or abroad. "A lot of this is about preemption," he said.

A lot? How about the entire case? And since when is "preemptive" prosecution constitutional? Apparently, when you are a Muslim in post-September 11-America.

The government did not initially charge these men with terrorism. Instead, the government charged the three men, along with eight others, with conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Acts -- obscure, longstanding, yet rarely-enforced laws that make it a crime for Americans to attack countries with which the United States itself is at peace.

The basis for these charges was that all eleven men were, in the past, supporters of Lashkar-i-Taiba -- an Islamic group that would like to oust India from Kashmir, and that has been accused by India of mass killings of Sikhs, and of partial responsibility for a December 2001 attack on India's Parliament.

In late 2001, the U.S. declared Lashkar-i-Taiba a terrorist organization. However, at the time the eleven men were alleged to have plotted to support the group, the organization was not yet on the list.

Nor did the men "attack" anyone, or any country -- as the Neutrality Act requires. Instead, prosecutors alleged that they played paintball, and fired legally owned firearms in the Virginia countryside, in order to prepare to someday help Lashkar-i-Taiba if necessary. (Two of the men also admitted to being in a training camp in Pakistan, and one of said he helped to recruit others to join in support of Lashkar-i-Taiba. But again, these activities preceded Lashkar-i-Taiba's designation as a terrorist organization.)

Prosecutors called these activities "paramilitary training" and "preparation for violent jihad" -- although both playing paintball and firing a gun are perfectly legal in Virginia.

To shoehorn these facts into a Neutrality Act prosecution, the prosecution also had to insinuate that this "training," alone, was in effect an attack on India. Indeed, the government's whole case was based on speculation that these men <u>might someday</u> go to fight on the side of Pakistan -- ironically, an American ally. That's a far cry from actually going right now to fight for a U.S. foe -- the kind of conduct the

Neutrality Act seeks to punish

Plainly, the Neutrality Act charges were not strong. After all, the Neutrality Act generally allows prosecutions of Americans who go to war to fight against American allies -- not Virginians who play paintball and politics in their own backyards, imagining they may someday aid a political organization they support.

The Terrorism Charges Were a Coercive Plea Bargaining Tactic

Perhaps realizing the weakness of the Neutrality Act charges, the government offered three-to-elevenyear sentences to the 11 men, if they would plead guilty. Of course, these are hardly the harsh sentence we would expect the Bush Administration to mete out to true terrorists.

Unsurprisingly, four of the 11 pled guilty early on. Even innocent persons may rationally choose a three-year prison term over the chance of a 50-year sentence. And Muslims, after September 11, may have seen a 50-year sentence as a certainty.

The remaining seven men were then the subjects of superseding indictments in which new charges of conspiracy to aid and abet terrorism were added. And this was not terrorism by Lashkar-i-Taiba, but terrorism by the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Such charges, of course, made it even less likely that the seven men could receive a fair trial -- especially in the conservative Eastern District of Virginia. So, not surprisingly, two more men -- including the two who actually went to the training camp -- pled guilty shortly after the superseding indictments were handed down. For their cooperation, they too received promises of sentences of 3 to 11 years.

That left five men. Charges against two were completely dropped. Three insisted on going to trial -- the three that were just convicted by Judge Brinkema.

Why did these three Americans insist on going to trial? My guess is that they were innocent. Why else would they fight what they knew to be an uphill battle, at great risk, rather than accept a few-year plea bargain, as others in a similar situation had done?

Discriminatory Prosecutions

Consider the following hypotheticals: Would Irish Americans who played paintball and played with guns in order to support the IRA have been similarly treated?

What about Jewish Americans who played paintball and engaged in target practice to train to support the Israeli army's actions in the Palestinian territories?

And even if these Irish and Jewish Americans <u>were</u> charged, would anyone possibly suggest that they were terrorists who might someday attack the United States as well?

Judge Brinkema suggested exactly this with respect to the three Muslim American defendants. She said she believed that those convicted *might someday* take up arms against the United States.

Yet the defendants' only proven animosity--if any -- was toward India, over its actions in Kashmir. There was no evidence to support the claim that they had <u>any</u> political animosity toward the U.S. -- let alone that they would ever violently attack their own country.

A Prejudiced Verdict? Using Religious Belief As a Sword Against Defendants.

The evidence against the three men came from three basic sources, all of which are troubling.

One source was the testimony of their co-defendants who had pled guilty in exchange for light sentences, based on their willingness to give this very testimony. Again, these co-defendants had been under tremendous pressure to take these plea bargains, regardless of their own guilt or innocence -- and to testify in support of the government, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the men they were testifying against. Can testimony be truly credible when it is given in exchange for freedom?

Another source was the three men's political beliefs: They thought India ought to get out of Kashmir, and said as much. But of course, that was their right, as Americans protected by the First Amendment's free speech clause.

Aportoer source was the three mens place of Worship. They arrended a Virulpia mosque in Williams.

Keshimipapen was discussed, and India's actions criticized. But of course, that was tried.

Americans protected by the First-Amendment's free exercise clause.

Three tainted sources of evidence led to three convictions.

Obviously, the government does not -- and cannot -- prosecute every supporter of a cause of which it does not approve. But Muslims today are easy targets. The evidence suggests that these prosecutions and convictions were motivated by discrimination and a desire to send a message to Muslims, not out of concern for national security or justice.

The evidence also suggests that the three men who exercised their right to a trial will serve long prison terms--what in effect will be life sentences--not for their actions, but rather for their insistence on exercising that constitutional rights.

The prosecutorial strategy of "Plead guilty or be labeled a terrorist" is coercive, and wrong for our government to employ in any case, terrorism or no terrorism.

Elaine Cassel practices law in Virginia and Washington, D.C. and teaches law and psychology. She also runs the website Civil Liberties Watch. Her book. The War on Civil Liberties: How Bush and Ashcroft Have Dismantled the Bill of Rights, will be published by Lawrence Hill this summer.

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The Family Steering Committee Statement and Questions
Regarding the 9/11 Commission Interview with President Bush
February 16, 2004
www.911independentcommission.org

The Family Steering Committee believes that President Bush should provide sworn public testimony to the full ten-member panel of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Collectively, the Commissioners are responsible for fulfilling the Congressional mandate. Therefore, each Commissioner must have full access to the testimony of all individuals and the critical information that will enable informed decisions and recommendations.

Before an audience of the American people, the Commission must ask President Bush in sworn testimony, the following questions:

- 1. As Commander-in-Chief on the morning of 9/11, why didn't you return immediately to Washington, D.C. or the National Military Command Center once you became aware that America was under attack? At specifically what time did you become aware that America was under attack? Who informed you of this fact?
 - 2. On the morning of 9/11, who was in charge of our country while you were away from the National Military Command Center? Were you informed or consulted about all decisions made in your absence?
 - 3. What defensive action did you personally order to protect our nation during the crisis on September 11th? What time were these orders given, and to whom? What orders were carried out? What was the result of such orders? Were any such orders not carried out?
 - 4. In your opinion, why was our nation so utterly unprepared for an attack on our own soil?
 - 5. U.S. Navy Captain Deborah Loewer, the Director of the White House Situation Room, informed you of the first airliner hitting Tower One of the World Trade Center before you entered the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida. Please explain the reason why you decided to continue with the scheduled classroom visit, fifteen minutes after learning the first hijacked airliner had hit the World Trade Center.
 - 6. Is it normal procedure for the Director of the White House Situation Room to travel with you? If so, please cite any prior examples of when this occurred. If not normal procedure, please explain the circumstances that led to the Director of the White House Situation Room being asked to accompany you to Florida during the week of September 11th.
 - 7. What plan of action caused you to remain seated after Andrew Card informed you that a second airliner had hit the second tower of the World Trade Center and America was clearly under attack? Approximately how long did you remain in the classroom after Card's message?

- 8. At what time were you made aware that other planes were hijacked in addition to Flight 11 and Flight 175? Who notified you? What was your course of action as Commander-in-Chief of the United States?
- 9. Beginning with the transition period between the Clinton administration and your own, and ending on 9/11/01, specifically what information (either verbal or written) about terrorists, possible attacks and targets, did you receive from any source?

This would include briefings or communications from

- o Out-going Clinton officials
- o CIA, FBI, NSA, DoD and other intelligence agencies
- o Foreign intelligence, governments, dignitaries or envoys
- o National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice
- o Richard Clarke, former counterterrorism czar
- 10. Specifically, what did you learn from the August 6, 2001, PDB [President's Daily Brief] about the terrorist threat that was facing our nation? Did you request any follow-up action to take place? Did you request any further report be developed and/or prepared?
- 11. As Commander-in-Chief, from May 1, 2001 until September 11, 2001, did you receive any information from any intelligence agency official or agent that UBL [Usama Bin Laden] was planning to attack this nation on its own soil using airplanes as weapons, targeting New York City landmarks during the week of September 11, 2001 or on the actual day of September 11, 2001?
- 12. What defensive measures did you take in response to pre-9/11 warnings from eleven nations about a terrorist attack, many of which cited an attack in the continental United States? Did you prepare any directives in response to these actions? If so, with what results?
- 13. As Commander-in-Chief from May 1, 2001 until September 11, 2001, did you or any agent of the United States government carry out any negotiations or talks with UBL, an agent of UBL, or al-Qaeda? During that same period, did you or any agent of the United States government carry out any negotiations or talks with any foreign government, its agents, or officials regarding UBL? If so, what resulted?
- 14. Your schedule for September 11, 2001 was in the public domain since September 7, 2001. The Emma E. Booker School is only five miles from the Bradenton Airport, so you, and therefore the children in the classroom, might have been a target for the terrorists on 9/11. What was the intention of the Secret Service in allowing you to remain in the Emma E. Booker Elementary School, even though they were aware America was under attack?
- 15. Please explain why you remained at the Sarasota, Florida, Elementary School for a press conference after you had finished listening to the children read, when as a terrorist target, your presence potentially jeopardized the lives of the children?

- 16. What was the purpose of the several stops of Air Force One on September 11th? Was Air Force One at any time during the day of September 11th a target of the terrorists? Was Air Force One's code ever breached on September 11th?
 - 17. Was there a reason for Air Force One lifting off without a military escort, even after ample time had elapsed to allow military jets to arrive?
 - 18. What prompted your refusal to release the information regarding foreign sponsorship of the terrorists, as illustrated in the inaccessible 28 redacted pages in the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry Report? What actions have you personally taken since 9/11 to thwart foreign sponsorship of terrorism?
 - 19. Who approved the flight of the bin Laden family out of the United States when all commercial flights were grounded, when there was time for only minimal questioning by the FBI, and especially, when two of those same individuals had links to WAMY, a charity suspected of funding terrorism? Why were bin Laden family members granted that special privilege -- a privilege not available to American families whose loved ones were killed on 9/11?
 - 20. Please explain why no one in any level of our government has yet been held accountable for the countless failures leading up to and on 9/11?
 - 21. Please comment on the fact that UBL's profile on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted Fugitives poster does not include the 9/11 attacks. To your knowledge, when was the last time any agent of our government had contact with UBL? If prior to 9/11, specifically what was the date of that contact and what was the context of said meeting.
 - 22. Do you continue to maintain that Saddam Hussein was linked to al Qaeda? What proof do you have of any connection between al-Qaeda and the Hussein regime?
 - 23. Which individuals, governments, agencies, institutions, or groups may have benefited from the attacks of 9/11? Please state specifically how you think they have benefited.

FSC Statement Regarding the Failure of the 9/11 Independent Commission to Subpoena the White House

February 10, 2004

The Family Steering Committee (FSC) is outraged by the failure of the 9/11 Independent Commission to subpoena the White House for complete access to the Presidential Daily Briefings.

The public needs to be aware that the President's statements on Meet the Press, on February 8, 2004, were misleading.

He stated that he is "cooperating" with the 9/11 Independent

Commission. Yet the Commission has been negotiating for access to these documents for over 10 months with no success. While the Commission negotiates with the Executive Branch, this nation remains at risk.

We therefore respectfully request that President Bush:

- Release all material requested by the Commission. Such information must be provided to all Commissioners so that it can be made part of their Final Report;
- 2. Testify under oath before the Commission in a public hearing as to his Administration's actions leading up to and including 9/11 as well as the immediate response to the attacks;
- 3. Support an extension of time for this Commission so it is able to:
 - a. Conduct the full schedule of public hearings, inclusive of high-ranking officials as witnesses (under oath);
 - b. Access (for all 10 Commissioners) to all relevant documents, including all PDBs (Presidential Daily Briefings), PDDs (Presidential Decision Directives), and NSPDs (National Security Presidential Directives), and the working notes behind those documents;
 - c. Thoroughly investigate all relevant facts with regard to this nation's preparedness for, and immediate response to, the attacks on 9/11, including all available testimony from federal whistleblowers, former and present federal agents/officials, and certain members of foreign governments.

This Administration must legitimately cooperate. Professing cooperation while limiting the time and resources of the Commission, and restricting access to important documents and key witnesses, only serves to further erode the safety and trust of the American people.

FSC Statement Regarding
The Importance of Gaining Access to the NSC

February 8, 2004

In May 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice made a statement that she did not know that planes could be used as missiles. She further stated that the United States government did not have specific information regarding the 9/11 attacks.

As National Security Advisor, it was Condoleezza Rice's job to know that the historical record was replete with instances of terrorists planning to use planes as missiles. Yet, as admitted in her own words, she did not. Furthermore, as National Security Advisor, it was Condoleezza Rice's job to coordinate information from the intelligence community and make policy decisions and recommendations to the President, in conjunction with other NSC

members, about dealing with terrorist threats. By Ms. Rice's own admission, she and her fellow NSC members apparently failed in this capacity, too.

The Clinton national security team gave three extensive briefings on the present danger of al Qaeda to the incoming Bush administration. Donald Kerrick, three star general, was Deputy National Security Adviser under President Clinton and served for the first four months of the Bush Administration on the National Security Council. General Kerrick has said that he wrote a memo for the Bush NSC stating, "we will be struck again." General Kerrick states that he received no response to his memo and was not included in any meetings.

It has also been reported that Richard Clarke, head of counterrorism on the NSC, was very frustrated during the first nine months of the Bush Administration. Clarke was reportedly frustrated because he tried to get the principals committee (the central body of top national security figures in the Administration) to take up terrorism as an issue. The principals in the Bush Administration, according to Clarke, finally discussed terrorism only once when they decided against funding the unmanned predator drone plane over Afghanistan prior to 9/11.

Also reported in the media are the statements and facts regarding the Iraqi war plan. Paul O'Neill writes that the Bush Administration had the Iraq war plan drawn up and finalized in the first few weeks of the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration has not denied this fact. Rather, the Administration has anecdotally stated that every incoming Administration has a desk full of work to sift through, prioritize, and explore. Apparently, the Bush Administration made its number one priority the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In doing so, Bin Laden and his al Qaeda network were ranked lower in priority. Why? Especially since we now know that Iraq was not an "imminent threat" while Al Qaeda apparently in the midst of planning an attack on 9/11 clearly was an imminent threat.

Once again, this issue revolves around the vital flow of intelligence information. Why was information detailing the clear and present danger of Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda "downplayed" by this Administration while at the very same time, apparently, the intelligence information regarding Saddam Hussein and Iraq was peppered up. Both of these facts regarding the Bush Administration's clear failure to prioritize matters of national security have cost lives. Three thousand people were murdered on the morning of 9/11, and thousands have been killed in the war in Iraq.

President Bush aptly stated on Meet the Press (2/08/04) that it is the President's most solemn responsibility to keep this country secure. President Bush also stated that commissions, in general, must take their time and learn lessons from the past because we live in a dangerous world. Asked if he would submit to questioning by the 9/11 Independent Commission, President Bush replied, "Perhaps, perhaps." On Meet the Press, President Bush also said he was cooperating with the 9/11 Independent Commission, and specifically cited the agreement on Presidential Daily Briefs.

In light of President Bush's admission of the importance of cooperation, the 9/11 Independent Commission must request President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense

Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice to testify in an open hearing while under oath to answer the following questions.

Questions that need to be answered:

- 1. Why did the Bush Administration fixate, prioritize, and explore the necessity to go to war in Iraq, while ignoring the clear and present danger of Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda who nine months later killed three thousand people on American soil? Was it the structure of the NSC that caused this failure?
- 2. Who determined the prioritization of terrorism issues in the early months of the Bush Administration? Who was consulted regarding such policy decisions? Who wrote the Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) carrying out such policy decisions? More importantly, what was the nature and substance of those PDDs?
- 3. Has the 9/11 Independent Commission adequately addressed this issue -- namely the failure of the Bush Administration, its NSC, and its Cabinet to properly assess imminent threats posed to this nation's security?
 - o Has the 9/11 Independent Commission gained full access to individuals and information to properly investigate this issue? If not, what areas of access must still be gained?
 - o Who has the 9/11 Independent Commission questioned regarding this issue?
 - o Has the 9/11 Independent Commission made any "deals" with Administrative officials with regard to the scope of access surrounding this issue? If so, what areas of access are blocked to the 9/11 Independent Commission, as a whole or in part?

FSC Statement Regarding the Need for an Extension

February 1, 2004

With little more than four months until May 27th , we feel that the Commission must request an extension from Congress regardless of whether the extension deadline is prior to or after the election. Our reasons are as follows:

- 1. The scaling back of the number and scope of public hearings. During the first year of the Commission's investigation, the Commission repeatedly promised that substantive, hard-hitting, investigative hearings with testimony from high-ranking officials would commence in January 2004. According to a recent Washington Post article and certain Commissioner's own admissions, these promised hearings are now being curtailed and/or cancelled due to time constraints.
- 2. The discovery of new information of probative value in need of further investigation by the Commission. Recently, new information with regard to 9/11 has been revealed. (See Newsweek, Mike Isikoff; See N.Y.Observer, Gail Sheehy)

According to media accounts, staff operations at the Commission are "frenzied" in their rush to complete their work by the May 27th deadline. As a result, certain specific, relevant information with regard to 9/11 is being "turned away" because of the Commission's need to focus on only broad issues. (See N.Y.Observer, comment by unnamed Commissioner)

3. The need for a Classified Final Report. The Commission is currently preparing a non-classified Final Report to be due out on May 27, 2004. The Commission, thereafter plans to release certain "supplemental classified monoliths." While this controlled release of information may please certain intelligence agency officials, the FSC is opposed to it. The FSC suggests the Commission issue a fully classified Final Report that would then be de-classified through the use of visible redactions. The FSC would recommend the Commission look towards the Joint Inquiry's Final Report as their model. The preparation of a classified Final Report requires more time and preparation by both Commissioners and Staff.

Please contact the Commission, the White House and your Congressional representatives to indicate your support for an extension, so the Commission will have sufficient time to complete a comprehensive in-depth investigation. Click on Action Alert for the addresses.

http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/FSCstmtQs.html (hypertext)
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/FSCstmtQs.txt (text only)
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/FSCstmtQs.pdf (print ready)

Subject: Revised & Complete; please use

Date: Thursday, July 21, 2005 9:23 AM

From: SibelDeniz@aol.com

To: <kylehence@earthlink.net>, <KFH@911citizenswatch.org>,

<john.judge@mail.house.gov>

National Security Experts Censored by the 9/11 Commission

For more information contact: Sibel Edmonds, Director-National Security Whistleblowers Coalition, sedmonds@nswbc.org <mailto:sibeldeniz@aol.com>

The Following National Security Whistleblowers were turned away, refused, or ignored by the 9/11 Commission, even though they had direct & relevant information related to the Commission's investigation:

Mark Burton (Senior Analyst- NSA) – Provided dozens of pages of information/ testimony to the 9/11 Commission, but was completely ignored and never asked to testify.

Mark Burton served as an all-source threat analyst in NSA's Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) for most of his 16-year career. He was the editor of IAD's premier threat document; the 300+ page ISSO Global Threat Summary, and was an adjunct faculty member at NSA's National Cryptologic School. During a three-year ICAP tour at the Army's National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), he was treated so poorly that he chose to resign from public service. He later provided dozens of pages of draft testimony to the 9/11 Commission, but the Commission ignored him. He has since been blacklisted from Federal employment, apparently via the insertion of slanderous information into his official records. He has an MA in national security studies from Georgetown University.

John M. Cole (Senior Counterintelligence Operations Manager-FBI) – He notified the 9/11 Commission during its investigation and never received response; also his name & contact information were provided to the Commission as key witness (Program manager for Pakistan & Afghanistan; has relevant information to 9/11 terrorist attack) by others, but he was not contacted.

John M. Cole, Former Veteran Intelligence Operations Specialist, worked for 18 years in the FBI's Counterintelligence Division as an Intelligence Operations specialist. Beginning in 1999, he discovered and began reporting serious issues of mismanagement, gross negligence, waste of government funds, security breaches, cover-ups, and intentional blocking of intelligence that had national security implications. He wrote these issues in several letters to FBI management, to include Director Mueller to no avail. After he reported these acts to FBI management, he was retaliated against, suspended and ultimately left the FBI in March 2004.

Bogdan Dzakovic (Former Red Team Leader-FAA)- His testimony to the Commission was completely left out of the final report.

Bogdan Dzakovic is a former Coast Guard Officer, Federal Criminal Investigator and has a graduate degree in Security Administration. He has worked for the Security Division of the Federal Aviation

Administration since 1987 as a Special Agent, as a Team Leader in the Federal Air Marshals, and from 1995 until September 11, 2001 was a Team Leader of the Red Team (terrorist team). He tried for several years prior to the 9-11 attacks to improve aviation security in the face of the ever-increasing terrorist threat. This included working through the established chain of command, with the Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General, with the General Accountability Office, and with members of both the House and Senate of the Congress of the United States. He filed a Whistleblower Case against the Federal Aviation Administration and testified at the 9-11 Commission.

Sibel Edmonds (Language Specialist-FBI) - She was refused twice; was given interview only after the Jersey Moms intervened directly; however, her testimony was censored by the Commission.

Sibel Edmonds worked as a language specialist for the FBI's Washington Field Office. During her work with the bureau, she discovered and reported serious acts of security breaches, cover-ups, and intentional blocking of intelligence that had national security implications. After she reported these acts to FBI management, she was retaliated against by the FBI and ultimately fired in March 2002. Since that time, court proceedings on her issues have been blocked by the assertion of "State Secret Privilege" by Attorney General Ashcroft; the Congress of the United States has been gagged and prevented from any discussion of her case through retroactive re-classification by the Department of Justice. Ms. Edmonds is fluent in Turkish, Farsi and Azerbaijani; and has a MA in Public Policy and International Commerce from George Mason University, and a BA in Criminal Justice and Psychology from George Washington University. (www.justacitizen.com http://www.justacitizen.com/)

Mike German (Special Agent, Counterterrorism-FBI) - Contacted the Commission in spring 2004, but did not receive any response from them.

Mike German served sixteen years as an FBI Special Agent and is one of the rare agents credited with actually having prevented acts of terrorism before it became the FBI's number one priority. In the early 1990s, Mike successfully infiltrated a Los Angeles white supremacist group that was engaged in a bombing campaign against racial minorities. In the late 1990's, after the Oklahoma City bombing, he again went undercover against right-wing militia groups that were conspiring to harm federal agents. Both cases disrupted multiple terrorist cells and led to criminal convictions that prevented terrorist acts. In 2002 Mike reported gross mismanagement in a post 9/11 counterterrorism investigation, which included serious violations of FBI policy and federal law. Despite his record Mike was prevented from working on other terrorism investigations in retaliation. Mike chose to resign from the FBI rather than remain silent about continuing failures in the FBI counterterrorism program.

Melvin A. Goodman (Former Senior Analyst/ Division Manager-CIA)-

Melvin Goodman is senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC and adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University. He served at the CIA as senior Soviet analyst from 1966-1990 and as professor of international security at the National War College from 1986-2004. He resigned from the CIA in 1990 to protest the politicization of intelligence on the Soviet Union and testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1991 against the confirmation of Robert M. Gates as director of central intelligence. At the time of his resignation, Goodman was a member of the Senior Intelligence Staff. He is the author and co-author of five books on international relations including "The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze," "The Phantom Defense: America's Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion," and "Bush League Diplomacy: How the Neoconservatives are Putting the World at Risk."

Gilbert Graham (Retired Special Agent, Counterintelligence-FBI) – His name & contact information were provided to the Commission as key witness in February 2004,

although he was willing to provide the Commission with information he was never contacted

Coleen Rowley (Retired Division Counsel- FBI) – The commission chose to only rely upon transcripts from the Joint Senate-House Intel Inquiry

FBI Minneapolis Field office – As far as Ms. Rowley is aware, no one from the FBI Minneapolis was asked to provide testimony/info to the 9/11 Commission

Gilbert Graham (Retired Special Agent, Counterintelligence-FBI) – His name & contact information were provided to the Commission as key witness in February 2004, although he was willing to provide the Commission with information he was never contacted

Joe Mansour (Federal Bureau of Prison) -

Behrooz Sarshar (Language Specialist-FBI) - He was refused twice; was given interview only after the Jersey Moms intervened directly; however, his testimony was completely removed from the commission's final report.

John Vincent (Retired Special Agent, Counterterrorism-FBI) – He was granted an interview but the commissioners' investigators refused to ask questions Re: info. Related to his case & 9/11 and insisted on asking only administrative and irrelevant questions.

John Vincent is a graduate of law school. He spent two years in the US Army, one year working for a US Congressman, and two years working in state government lawmaking. He joined the FBI in 1975 and worked there for 27 1/2 years before retiring in 2002. He worked his last 8 years in counter terrorism. Mr. Vincent, along with Robert Wright exposed the inefficiencies within the FBI in working counter terrorism cases.

Robert Wright (Veteran Special Agent, Counterterrorism-FB) - FBI refused to allow Wright to testify, but the Commission did not insist or attempted to subpoena Wright

About National Security Whistleblowers Coalition

National Security Whistleblowers Coalition (NSWBC), founded in August 2004, is an independent and nonpartisan alliance of whistleblowers who have come forward to address our nation's security weaknesses; to inform authorities of security vulnerabilities in our intelligence agencies, at nuclear power plants and weapon facilities, in airports, and at our nation's borders and ports; to uncover government waste, fraud, abuse, and in some cases criminal conduct. The NSWBC is dedicated to aiding national security whistleblowers through a variety of methods, including advocacy of governmental and legal reform, educating the public concerning whistleblowers suffering retaliation and other harms, and working with other public

TWELVE CHARACTERISTICS OF A NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

- 1. Visible Increase in Uniformed Security Personnel
- 2. Lack of Civil Accountability of Law Enforcement and Security Personnel
- Reduced Role of the Judiciary and Executive Treatment of Suspects
- 4. Secrecy of Ruling Authority and Momentum of Threat
- 5. Media in the Service of the State
- Public and National Resources Called to Service Against Security Threat
- Patriotism Moving to Nationalism
- 8. Lack of Critical Response by Religious Denominations
- 9. Wartime Mentality and Permanent War Economy
- 10. Targeted Individuals or Groups
- 11. Direct Attack against Dissent
- 12. Increased Surveillance of Citizenry

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Author: No Greater Threat: America After September 11 and the Rise of a National Security State (Algora, 2002)

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